File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎314v] (637/834)

I
—
- .".■ t'-gga
— 48 —
you surrender to these Arab rebels, beware of being cursed
by the Moslem world and by historians for ever.
“ Remember that Tahsin Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , who surrendered Salonica
to the Greeks, is still in disgrace. That our brothers in
Tripoli and Asir obeyed their consciences and refused when
called upon to surrender ; and that in the Balkan War the
Bulgarians forced us to sign an armistice at Chatalja ; but
we made them finally sign the Peace of Adrianople.”
Fakhri's Relations with the Garrison.
Fakhri seems to have acted throughout the siege on the
ignotum pro magnijico principle. Dr. Shevket’s diary contains no
personal touches about him whatsoever. When he reached Bir
Derwish after his arrest in the Haram and had conversed with
Haidar Bey, he expressed himself glad to talk, as he had, he
said, spoken hardly a word to anyone for two months. His
policy appears to have paid him well up to a point; for during
the visit of the first commission to Bir Derwish it was apparent
that even Ali Negib stood in wholesome awe of him.
He appears, too, to have kept the garrison in ignorance of
events outside as much as possible and to have encouraged them
to resist by misstatements, e.g. that surrender would involve the
handing over of the keys of the Holy City to a British captain.
On December 26, on the other hand, Dr. Shevket records that he
summoned all unit commanders to him and read them the armistice
conditions, adding that acceptance of them would involve impri
sonment in Egypt. But this can only have been to counteract
the statements which Captain Zia had made privately to the staff ;
for normally everything arriving by post was censored by him,
and all newspapers were burned unread in his presence. As a
rule, such bad news as reached the garrison was derived from
rumours or belated official communiques which Fakhri allowed
to pass. The wireless stations, however, were a source of
leakage. Emin Bey, as said above, picked up the Armistice
conditions before they were deciphered in Medina. Finally,
Fakhri personally conducted all important diplomatic negotiations
with notables, e.g. Ibn Saud, his relations with whom are described
elsewhere.
His aloofness, however, put him naturally at a disadvantage
by keeping him out of immediate touch with the feeling of the
garrison and dependent on espionage. Emin Bey was able to
engineer his conspiracy in a day, Fakhri apparently not knowing
of it till after the circulation of the Central Committee’s manifesto,
by which time Emin himself was out of reach.
Strict bounds were enforced throughout the siege. For
ong periods no troops were allowed out of barracks ; and in
general they mixed very little with the civilian population, though
or the most part the nearest enemy points were at least fifteen
miles away.