File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎291v] (591/834)

MEDINA.
Events have still to prove Fakhri Pasha’s precise reasons
for refusing to surrender Medina. That he is acting in collusion
with Ibn Saud is firmly believed by King Husein, and is
very probable. Since the last Bulletin, two fresh pieces
of evidence—neither, however, in itself conclusive—have
come to hand. First, the Turkish envoy, on his return from
Medina, asserted that Fakhri was in touch with the Yemen,
Ibn Saud and Khalid * ; and, secondly, Ibn Rashid’s represen
tative at Mecca told Colonel Wilson that he had frequently seen
Ibn Sand’s camels in Medina, as recently, in fact, as last August.
There is increasing evidence, on the other hand, that Fakhri is
actuated, partly at any rate, by religious sentiment, and that he
has inspired a large proportion of his garrison with a fanatical
resolve to defend the Prophet’s Tomb. The relative strength of
these and similar possible motives cannot yet be gauged with any
precision ; but the story of his successive subterfuges in evading
the terms of the Armistice—tabulated for convenience below
proves at least the strength of his determination to hold out.
(1) On November 10 he received the general en clair
wireless message addressed by Ahmed Izzet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , Minister
for War at Constantinople, to all the garrisons in Hejaz,
Asir and Yemen, ordering them to surrender to the nearest
Allied commander. This was confirmed by a letter from
Captain Garland at Yenbo. The answer, however, consisted
of a brief note signed by the chief o£ staff. It did not reach
Yenbo till December 14, and was to the effect that Fakhri
was considering the matter, but was in doubt as to the
authenticity of the wireless message.
(2) On November 30 the latter was repeated in cipher,
with the addition of a clause that Emir Ali was the Allied
commander nearest to him. In reply he informed Yenbo,
almost a week later, that telegraphic messages were in
sufficient, and that he must have signed instructions from
his Go vernment.
(3) By this time it had become evident that he was
playing for time. A messenger despatched with a note by
Captain Garland, for example, was sent back with a request
that he should return in four days since the intervention of
the Prophet’s birthday prevented Fakhri from attending to
an}/ other matters.
It was accordingly arranged that a letter should be sent
by special envoy from Constantinople ; and that Fakhri
*11118 is almost certainly Khalid ibn Derwish, a leading Sheikh of
the Abadua, who after many years of close relationship with Kino- Husein
-who made him Emir of Khurma-became a convert to Wahhabism in
1914 and joined Ibn Saud. The King attributes the whole Khurma
trouble to bis actions {see A.B., pp. 200, 229, 245, 246, 262, 307, 329)