File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎285v] (579/834)

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impotence and are content to let the Great Powers settle the
issue, while they clamour for maximum pay and take minimum
risks. Many of the operations planned against Loheiya were
postponed or abandoned owing to nothing more than squabbles
over money, which absorbed all Seyyid Mustafa’s time, to the
exclusion for instance, of the manning of new guns.
(2) Lack of Leaders.
There were none of any real worth. Sayyid Mustafa,
Mustafa el-Nueimi, and Sherif Hamud are mentioned by Captain
Clayton as being better than the rest. Sayyid Mustafa was
easily the best, being whole-hearted, honest, of untiring energy,
and possessing great influence. But even he was of little use
for he took too much on himself, would not accept advice,
and allowed himself to be side-tracked by irrelevancies. After
these there was positively no one.
(3) Failure of the Supply Organization.
Sheer mismanagement in several instances brought opera
tions to a standstill for want of supplies of which there should
have been abundance. The wastage, too, of water food and
ammunition was enormous.
(4) Specific Instances of Failure.
These and similar shortcomings wrecked each successive
plan. The abandonment of Loheiya on September 15 was attri
buted to lack of water, though more than ample was b&ng landed
by H.M. ships, and the retreat was totally unjustifiable. A
plan to recapture the place was fully mature on September 27,
when Sherif Hamud said that he must have three hundred water
bottles, which were both unprocurable and unnecessary. The
whole scheme was given up on that account. On October 22,
H.M.S. Espiegle offered to go in to within seven thousand yards of
el-Atn and fire salvoes at the Turkish positions there. El-Nueimi,
in command at el-Ganda, said that his organization was incom
plete, and cancelled the arrangements. Next night however he
attacked without any support from the Espiegle, and without
warning, with the result that he could not maintain his advance.
All of these three operations should have succeeded had there been
any proper discipline or co-ordination in carrying them out.
In a conversation with the Idrisi and Sayyid Mustafa Captain
Clayton had even to suggest that they should form a reserve,
which they had apparently disregarded altogether.
Captain Clayton finally gives it as his opinion that the Idrisian
army, in anything like its present state, is unlikely to be a factor
of any importance whatsoever.
(c) Character of the Idrisi.
Captain Clayton points out that the Idrisi is too remote from
his army to affect its efficiency in the field. His main value for
us lies rather in his domestic policy, where he stands for order
in circumstances that might otherwise be chaotic.