File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎182r] (372/834)

to hold on to Hasa for long, in view of the well-known cupidity
and acquisitiveness of Great Powers. What is certain is that
should the Allies win and the Turks be driven out of Arabia he
will have the mortification of finding his rival the Sherif firmly
established as an influential and powerful monarch able to count
on the support of Great Britain and the Mohammedan world ;
while he (Ibn Sand) remains a mere Bedouin chieftain, as he
was before the war, but with the Shammar and Northern Anazeh
irretrievably lost and the Sherif claiming overlordship over the
border tribes. If, on the other hand, the Central Powers conquer,
as he thinks they will, he will have the satisfaction of seeing
King Husein go down, while as regards his own position he
relies on his political acumen to drive some sort of bargain with
the Turks.
“ This does not mean that Ibn Sand is pro-Turk. He hates
the lurk as his ancestors did, and he likes and admires the
British, infidels though they are. But it is a matter of policy,
and when policy is concerned he must regard the matter entirely
from the point of view of self-interest, i.e. the interest of his
dynasty and the Wahabi faith. He will not be induced to take
any action unless the object is justified primarily in these
interests: in other words he has got it into his head that he is
not going to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us or for any
one. This is perhaps the reason why fbn Saud has not attempted
seriously to take Hail or performed any noteworthy feat during
the war. He hopes that when our subsidies cease, the tribes now
supporting the Sherif will return to their former allegiance. He
says that the Sherif is already on bad terms with some of the
Harb, and told me one day with manifest elation that the Barqah
section of the Ateibah had been converted in a body to the
‘ Ikhwan,’ a religious brotherhood, which Ibn Saud is fostering
to the utmost of his ability.
“If the view of Ibn Sand’s policy which I have endeavoured
to set down is correct, it can be seen how foolish it would be to
expect any thorough going co-operation from him even if more
liberally subsidized. Indeed it is quite probable that any
additional subsidies we might give him would be used to buy back
Harb and Ateibah chiefs who are now with the Sherif.
“What would fully satisfy Ibn Saud is as follows (but
considerable modification of it would be accepted !) :—
“(i) That we should observe towards him the same policy of
trust and confidence as we pursue in the case of the Sherif.
“ (ii) Treating him on an equality with the Sherif, we
should acknowledge his hegemony in Nejd, Central Arabia and
its dependencies ; and, as we have conceded the style and title of
His Highness King of the Hejaz to the Sherif, we should proclaim
himself as His Highness the Hakim (or Ruler) of Nejd.
“ (iii) That all tribal allowances made by us to the tribes of
Central Arabia, including the Anazeh and Ateibah, Muteir, Sbefi
Beni Hajar, Qahtan, Dawasir, Manasir, Ahl Murrah, Beni