File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎154v] (317/834)

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Soon after my departure, however, Ibn Saud, who had
already begun to tax the Awazim, a tribe regarded by Ibn Sabah
as his very own, induced them to leave Kuweit and settle in his
own territory. Then, I think, Salim began to look around him
for friends in the desert. Naturally these were the Shammar
and Ajman. These quickly took the hint and by the beginning
of October the Ajman had moved down en masse into Kuweit
territory under the leadership of the Hithlein. I his in the <
game of desert chess was Salim’s reply to Ibn Saud’s “ Check,”
and the move put a somewhat ditt'erent complexion on the
board. Ibn Saud’s next move had to be a defensive one. His
position in Qasim was not altogether comfortable in spite of a
tacitly acknowledged truce with Hail, because his forces had
dispersed to their homes in the south. He found it expedient,
therefore, to temporize with the Shammar. He allowed them
into his territory on condition that they camped round the wells
of Artawiyah, and his son Turki, then in charge of Qasim, gave
them passes for supplies in Kuweit. So the Shammar, courted
both by Riyadh and Kuweit, have had the run of their teeth
both in Qasim and Kuweit, thus upsetting our blockade arrange
ments, but Salim had scored a diplomatic triumph.
On my return to Kuweit in October, I found that great
changes had taken place both in Kuweit itself and in the desert.
Salim’s foreign policy was voted clever by the people of Kuweit.
He had gained much prestige as a statesman. He had become
more affable and tolerant, blockade restrictions were relaxed and
he had grown to be almost popular. Not that popularity is an
attribute that one would ever associate with a character like
his; still, Salim had developed considerably and I felt that he
was bent on taking a line of his ow r n.
On the whole, I consider Salim has achieved a definite
personal success due entirely to his own efforts. One much
regretted that this success was gained to some extent at our
expense, I mean as regards calling in the Ajman and Shammar
and relaxing blockade restrictions. But one could not but admire
his success in overcoming internal and external opposition by his
grit and daring. He has since tried a fall with us over the
establishment of a Blockade Post, but in that he was up against
too big a proposition and I am hoping that the result will be a
warning to him as well as a ground for increased mutual respect
between us. And if only the question of the Shammar could be
settled by their abandoning the Turks and coming over to our
side, I believe that we should not do badly in taking Salim as a
counsellor, and using him as a lever for our policy in Central
Arabia. Khazal is Mesopotamian. Ibn Saud is ambitious and
has his own fish to fry. He will never work as our man to the
extent that Salim might possibly be induced to work.
:. r ^ ia . ve enough to show that, to all appearances, Salim’s
-position in Kuweit is secure and his relations with the merchants
(he is a keen trader himself) are good. Were this not the case,