File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎50r] (108/834)

by delaying the arrival of reinforcements from Medina, for the
operation undertaken simultaneously by Sherif Abdullah at Bir
Nasif. By 8 a.m. the Turks had evacuated their advanced
positions with the exception of one post which continued to hold
out, and upon which the fire of the whole battery was now
concentrated. By 9 a.m, as it appeared that the latter work was
sufficiently demolished, the Bedouins attempted to rush it, but
were driven back by the rifle fire of the Turks.
At 9.30 two sections of guns were switched on to the main
enemy position covering the station, the remaining section
continuing to engage the advanced work, which still maintained
its resistance and from which the sections engaging the station
were subjected to a somewhat heavy rifle fire. By 10 a.m. the
station buildings were in flames, but at this juncture Turkish
reinforcements, consisting of a company of engineers with a gun,
arrived by train from the north, shortly followed by a battalion
of infantry with two guns and two machine guns railed up from
the south. Neither train was able however, to reach Bowat
owing to extensive demolitions to the line both N. and S. of the
scene of action providently carried out during the preceding
night. The Turks accordingly began to repair the line under
cover of their guns, but by noon, not awaiting the completion of
this task, their infantry and machine guns moved up to support
the threatened posts at Bowat, whereupon the Arabs, already
considerably shaken by the moral effect of the Turkish gun-fire
(though the actual loss sustained therefrom was negligible),
commenced their retirement this movement being completed by
3. p.m. During the whole action the Arab casualties amounted
only to one officer and five Bedouins wounded.
In some interesting observations upon the general conduct
of this engagement, Lieut. Kernag lays stress upon the utter
lack of co-ordination in command, and of discipline among the
Arab officers. The offensive spirit is also wholly wanting to
the Arabs generally—the infantry refusing resolutely to advance
beyond the screen of their artillery, with the result that
throughout the greater part of the action the guns were actually
engaged in front of the infantry which it was their role to
support. Similarly in the final retirement the artillery were the
last unit to withdraw !]
On November 27, the line was broken and there was fighting
between Seil Matara and Zumurrud. This raid, if not done by
the Ferhan-Abdullah combination, which has been acting latterly
near Hadiyah, was probably the work of Sherif Sharraf and his
reconnoitring party (see p. 474), or of both forces acting in
concert.
Aziz Effendi has gone up to the railway for demolition work,
taking some Turkish deserters with him as decoys to attract
more.