Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎433r] (866/1144)

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in hi* hpart He did not wish to go back into matters which were better, perhaps, J
left in the past to which they belonged, but he would like to real! t ' 61 .''’ ! ,
which he had had with Mr. Churchill (then Secretary of State for the Colonies
just before he left England to go to Iraq as a candidate for the throne. A
conversation Mr. Churchill had explained a policy which he had agreed to to ,
and he thought he might say that, since that date, he had worked out that po
fn all sinSty and loyalty. He felt now, however, that the stage covered by the
Alerstanding entered into with Mr. Churchill had been ‘^versed and a nen
stage lav before his country. What path were they to follow .°" n „ P^'
bearing'in mind the close alliance into which he had entered with Great Britain
he was g most anxious that the policy of his Government m ^d^th
that of His Maiesty’s Government. It was for this reason that he would 11 e
discuss with me several aspects of the Arab question with which his Governme
v.ere^onfmnted des i re( i t0 establish a line of communication between
Iraq and the Mediterranean. This could be done either ^ough .yria o
Palestine. The Iraqi Government, however, were puzzled to know which route
to favour. On the one hand, the manner in which the French mandate had been
exercised in Svria gave them no hope that there would in the near future
up in Syria a Government favourably disposed to Arab aspirations; aiM on the
other hand, although they felt confident of the genera sympathy of His Majesty s
Government, the development of Zionism in Palestine gave rise to
misgivings concerning the future of the Arabs in Palestine. The ra
beino- driven out of Palestine and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , and would soon be quite unable
to withstand the economic and financial strength of the Jews. The potentialities
of such a situation made Palestine unattractive as a route for Iraq s line ot
communication with the sea. . . . . . . n
15. These problems could, King Feisal explained, in his opinion all be
solved if the Arabs worked in harmony with British policy, and continued to
enioy British sympathy and support. His aim was to lay down a policy in
full Consultation with His Majesty’s Government and thereby to obviate the
possibility of embarking on a course of action which might mvohe his Govern
ment in serious difficulties with His Majesty’s Government, or even jeopardise
the continuance of the happy relations now existing betvveen the two countries.
For example, there was a growing desire among peop e in ^aq, and their
representatives in Parliament and the Government, to help the Arabs m Syria,
and it had been proposed that Iraq, as a member of the League of N M 10I ? S -
should in the Assembly, challenge the French application to Syria of the
nrincinles of article 22 of the Covenant of the League. What would be the
attitude of His Majesty's Government towards such a demarche f Again, so long
as Syria remained under a French mandate in its present form, the Iraqi Govern-
ment felt obliged to obstruct the development of Syrian communications with Iraq,
and across Iraq with Persia, as they feared that, particularly m the north, any
facilities given for the development of lines of communication with Syria would
te used by the French for the spread of their influence into Iraq. Such a pohcy
might involve the Iraqi Government in difficulties with France, to which His
Majesty’s Government could not remain indifferent. Here again, he would be
g ' a ^16 t replied that I could not, of course, give an immediate opinion on
the very important issues which His Majesty had raised. I promised however,
to inform my colleagues of the most interesting and valuable conversation which
I had had with him, and I undertook that the situation which he had descri >ec
should be most fully considered.
Arab Congress.
17 I mentioned also the matter of the proposed Arab congress, and
explained the view of His Majesty’s Government that the holding of such a
congress in Bagdad would, in all probability, cause serious embarrassments for
Iraq with^neighbour^iied ^ he attached far more importance to working
out with His Majesty’s Government a policy which would offer reasonable hope
of bringing about the realisation of Arab aspirations than to the congress, and.
provider! such a policy could be agreed upon, he would exercise all his in pence
to prevent the congress from being held in Bagdad or elsew here.
[851 a—1] B 2
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