Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎359v] (719/1144)

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that have arisen between Iraq and its Arab and Islamic neighbours. Xenophobia
has also reared its head in the labour market in Iraq where, as in Egypt some
years ago when considerable hostility was shown by Egyptians to officials of
Syrian or Lebanese origin, Syrians are still regarded bitterly and begrudged the
savings they make and export to their own country. In Syria, Saudi Arabians
or Iraqis are generally despised, secretly if not always openly, and scoffed at as
“ ajanib ” (“ajanib” is one of the Arabic words for foreigner and has an
opprobrious tang to it). Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , too, has shown the same distaste for
foreigners. Great fear of the Zionist movement has made the Palestine Arab
slightly more tolerant of his brethren from adjoining countries. Possibly a
cantonment system, the idea of which Mr. Archer Gust recently revived, could it
be made workable, might render leaders of Arab political thought there more
exclusively Palestinian in their outlook. They appear, even to-day, to be loath
to consider amalgamating their lot, except as the dominant partner, with that of
the more primitive Arab population of Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
Saudi Arabia, being on a much lower plane of social evolution, has witnessed
a slower growth of “ national" spirit and so less objection is at present raised to
the enlistment of the services of “ ajanib." A noteworthy instance of this is the
employment of a Druse (the last of heretics to a Wahabi, one might suppose) as an
important official.
The position of Egypt in the pan-Arab movement is by no means clear. It
has shown little sign of wishing to take any collective responsibility in an Arab
or Islamic confederation. Indeed, it has been said that Egypt has yet to make
up its mind whether it is an Arab, a Pharaohic or a would-be-western State.
If the facts and tendencies of the Arab movement have been fairly indicated
so far in this memorandum, it is evident that the whole matter is in a state of
considerable confusion and charged with incompatibilities.
The partition of the Arab or quasi-Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire
into separate States, and the internal organisation of some of these newly-formed
States on differing European lines, have created a peculiar political situation,
and have at the same time confronted Arabian politicians with three conflicting
alternatives : pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and nationalism. The effort to render
these alternatives mutually sympathetic has led to obvious contradictions, which
seem to have weakened each and have led to a dissipation of vital political force,
for any one of them argued to its natural conclusion rules out the other two. The
pan-Arabists urge the suppression of the individual State and seek to abolish
as between Arabs all political and religious barriers. But these same pan-Arab
rhetoricians are no less ardent in demanding the exclusion from State-paid
employment Arabs from neighbouring countries, or in protesting against having
an undue number of Christians, as in Syria and Palestine, or of Sunnis or Shiahs
(according to the religious complexion of the speaker) in Iraq. Iraq, rich in its
oil royalties, feels no urge to share its wealth with Syria or Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , through
which countries its oil passes to the markets of the world, while Syria cultivates
the hope that its independence will enable it to extort from Iraq transit dues on
the oil passing through its territory. Perhaps it is in these local jealousies (and
they are only taken as samples and are by no means exhaustive) that to-day, as
900 years ago, lies the weakness of the Arab movement and of Islam as a
permanent political force.
The power of religious as distinct from political (and the distinction exists)
Islam to weld the heterogeneous elements into a whole may also be doubted,
notwithstanding the fact that a considerable weight of Arab opinion favours the
possibility. The ability of the faith to infuse strength into resistance against
English, French and Jewish “colonisation" is marked, but it represents only
half of the present story of pan-Islamism. The other half concerns the possibility
of reconciliation of the many Islamic schisms : Sunni, Shiah (the main ones),
Wahabi, Metawileh, Ansariyeh, Druse, and many smaller sects; and, finally, the
numerous Islamic confraternities. In addition, the element of Christian Arabs,
particularly in the ranks of the intelligentsia, is by no means as negligible as their
numbers would seem to imply.
So great and intangible are the difficulties of establishing pan-Arabism on
a religious basis that it may seriously be questioned whether the religious aspect
is of any importance at all beyond its immediate value as a focal point against
the European Powers immediately affected.