Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎276v] (553/1144)

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ambitions. But there are many people who refuse to believe this, especial!) since
the absorption of the Malay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta), and these people
maintain that sooner or later Turkey will take steps to obtain control of ..Ueppo
and Mosul, if not of areas further south. Although it is unlikely that Turkey
will take these steps so long as her political interests tie her to Great Britain and
France, the existence of latent ambitions of this kind is probable enough. If
these latent ambitions do exist, an Arab federation might, indeed, appear to
Turkish eyes as a prospective obstacle to Turkish interests, although it would be
difficult for the Turkish Government to say this openly.
16. There remains to be considered the position of Great Britain. His
Majesty’s Government are sometimes exhorted to have a “ comprehensive policy
for the Middle East( 2 ) and to formulate and pursue this policy on a “ long view.”
This is admirable advice, but of a kind which it is seldom possible to follow
effectively in practice. There may be an “ ideal Middle East, a grouping of
States or political systems which would suit British interests better than any
other. But it would" be difficult to find any two persons to agree on what form
this ideal should take and even if the ideal were self-evident it would probably
be most difficult, if not impossible, to bring it into being. For the purposes of day-
to-day diplomacy it is necessary to be less ambitious, to take the Middle East as it
is and to endeavour to addpt the existing scheme of things to the more obvious
needs of British Imperial policy.
17. The fundamental British interests in the Middle East are, as it happens,
well defined. They are communications and oil. Great Britain has two main
lines of communication from the Mediterranean to India, Australia and the Far
East. The first, which is primarily a sea route, runs through the Suez Canal
and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean; the second, which is primarily an air route,
runs from the Mediterranean coast, through Palestine, Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Iraq,
to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and thence down its Avestern shore to the Indian Ocean. The
principal sources of oil are Persia (Iran) and Iraq, with Bahrein and Saudi
Arabia making rapid progress. The Persian oil is shipped by way of the Persian
Gulf. The Iraqi oil is shipped from Tripoli and Haifa, on the Mediterranean
coast. In years to come increases in the range of aircraft, the discovery of oil in
large or larger quantities in the United Kingdom or Canada or other develop
ments may alter the strategic basis of the British Empire and make it possible for
British policy to be less concerned with developments in the Middle East. But,
until that day comes, Great Britain must in some form or other—not necessarily
the precise form of to-day—conduct her relations with the Middle Eastern
countries, through varying degrees of protection, influence, alliance and friend
ship, so as to ensure that her essential interests shall continue. In particular
she must maintain effective control, whether direct or indirect, of certain vital
points like Haifa, the Suez Canal, Aden, the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and the Basra-Haifa
air route, and she would not care to see any European Power less friendly than
France established in Syria and the Lebanon.
18. Judging their needs by this standard, His Majesty’s Government do
know fairly AA^ell what they Avant from each of the Arab countries; and, in spite of
German and Italian rivalry and an unpopular policy in Palestine, they haA^e con
trived until noAv to maintain their position as the predominant Power in the
Middle East. It is impossible in pursuing any policy, “ consistent ” or otherAvise,
to please all the Middle Eastern countries and peoples equally. When one can
only be pleased at the cost of displeasing another, all that can be done is to balance
the major against the minor interest.
19. How then, in the light of all this, ought His Majesty’s Government to
regard the question of closer Arab union ?
20. It is sometimes supposed by advocates of pan-Arab ideas that Great
Britain must necessarily be opposed to these ideas for much the same reasons as
France opposes them, and particularly because a single State embracing all the
Arab countries would not be amenable to British influence in the same wav as a
number of small and weaker States. The invitations extended to the Arab States
to be represented at the conferences on Palestine may haA^e shaken this belief to
( a ) This term is used here to cover the Arab countries mentioned in paragraph 1 , with the
addition of Persia (Iran). It is usually held to embrace Turkey too, but Turkey lies outside the
problem here under discussion. It might also be held to ?nclude Afghanistan, whose main
importance is her position as a buffer between India and the Soviet Union.