Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎138r] (276/1144)

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the less backward Arab countries further north. We are satisfied that L
experiments in federation are to have any prospect of success they must at first be
confined to Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. For the present our
main action should be in the direction of securing closer economic co-operation
between these four territories, and the British representatives in the Middle
East should be invited to draw up a scheme on this economic (not political) basis
” =f " - aor consideration by His Majesty’s Government and, if approved by them, by
the Free French authorities. On the political side, we should have no objection
to the now independent Syria and the Lebanon adhering to the existing treaty
of “ Arab Brotherhood and Alliance.” On the cultural side, our representatives
in the Middle East could be asked to consider what non-political projects of a
cultural nature, designed to establish closer harmony between the Arab States,
are deserving of encouragement.
11. We have given attention, when examining these problems, to the difficult
question of how British interests and British strategic needs can best be safe
guarded if, as we believe is probable, the Arab Nationalist movement grows in
importance, and Arab federation becomes a more immediate problem than it is
at present. Unfortunately, the pan-Arab movement, the more extreme form of
Arab nationalism, is largely inspired by anti-foreign motives. The Aiab desire
for a closer union, in so far as such a desire exists, is in effect a wish to form a
block of Arab States which will be strong enough to secure what are considered
to be Arab rights in Palestine and Syria, and to present a united front to foreign
Powers, especially Great Britain and France. It may easily be supposed that
the movement for Arab federation is likely to degenerate into an anti-British,
anti-French and, above all, an anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish movement. This is a
very real danger. It is for this reason that it is so important that His Majesty’s
Government should not content themselves with a purely negative policy, but
should show positive sympathy towards the movement and endeavour to guide it
so far as possible, on lines which are both advantageous to the Arabs themselves
and not incompatible with British interests.
12. It is important, in any case, that those responsible for British policy
in the Middle East, if they are to endeavour to guide the movement on lines which
are compatible with British interests, should bear in mind British strategic needs
in the Arab States. Essential British interests in the Middle East have been
defined as communications and oil. It is clear that we shall at least require to
maintain those naval, military and air facilities which are essential to protect
those interests. These are all points which will call for full consideration at the
proper time.
13. We have also considered, as required by our terms of reference, how
far a scheme of Arab federation might assist a solution of the Palestine problem.
On this point proposals have been put forward in various quarters which, in our
view, fall entirely without the range of practical politics. It has been suggested,
for example, that Ibn Saud, in return for British support for some scheme of
Arab federation under his own supreme control, and in consideration of certain
financial inducements, might be persuaded to give the Jews a free hand in
Palestine and allow them to turn Palestine into a Jewish State. We cannot
regard such a suggestion as deserving of serious consideration. It is quite certain
that a man of Ibn Saud’s high spirit and honourable character could not be bribed
or cajoled into taking a step which every Arab would regard as a shameful
surrender of Arab interests. 14
14. At the same time, we do not rule out all possibility that a scheme of
Arab federation might assist in a solution of the Palestine problem. It is
necessary, however, to be clear exactly what we mean by the phrase “ a solution
of the Palestine problem.” What we have in mind is the replacement of the
Mandate by some permanent system of Government in Palestine, which shall be
acceptable alike to both Jews and Arabs. The prospects of both communities
agreeing on such a solution are admittedly very slight. Nevertheless, it is just
conceivable that the Arabs, if they wish to secure the disappearance of the
Mandate and the participation of Palestine in an Arab Federation, might be
willing to acquiesce in a greater degree of Jewish penetration than they^would
otherwise contemplate, and that the Jews of Palestine on their part might come
[23330] ° c