Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎137r] (274/1144)

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still at the height of his power. A second argument in favour of taking the
initiative at present is that we now have in the Middle East a much stronger
military force than we can ever hope to maintain there in time of peace, with
the result that, for the moment at any rate, British influence is greater now than
^^4t is likely to be after our troops have been withdrawn. Thirdly, the grant of
Independence to Syria and the Lebanon, and the supersession (to that extent) of
the Syrian Mandate, may be expected to stimulate Arab aspirations elsewhere,
particularly in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, where, as time goes on, there may
be increasing agitation against the continued maintenance of the Mandatory
regime. If it were practical politics to carry through some scheme of Arab
federation which would also comprise a satisfactory solution of the Palestine
problem, there would be much to be said in favour of immediate action, without
awaiting the end of the war.
5. There are, on the other hand, strong arguments against an endeavour to
promote a political federation of Arab States at the present moment. In the
first place, there is nothing to show that Arab opinion is yet prepared for any
scheme of federation.* Secondly, we believe that any scheme would in practice
arouse such contentious issues that its discussion would inflame political passions
throughout the Arab world, and probably also throughout the Jewish world.
Thirdly, we are convinced that any scheme sponsored by His Majesty’s Government
would be received with suspicion, and would probably arouse much unnecessary
anti-British feeling, at a time when it is essential not to take any incautious step
which might give our enemies in the Arab w r orld an opportunity for exciting
agitation against us. It is mainly for these reasons that our representatives in
the Arab countries have unanimously recommended that the main problem should
be allowed to lie dormant until the present imminent dangers of war in the Middle
East have passed.
6. As regards Arab opinion, we are given to understand that “ federation
has never represented a fixed or genuine aspiration on the part of the Arab States
or the Arab peoples as a whole, and must not be taken as one of the fundamental
aims of the Arab national movement. So far as we are aware, there is at the
present moment no Arab scheme of “ federation " in existence. There is no
evidence that, if His Majesty’s Government were to put forward such a scheme,
it would meet with favour in any quarter. It is not always remembered that
three at least of the Arab territories, viz., Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen,
have enjoyed a full measure of independence for a number of years past. If they
had wished to federate, there was nothing to prevent them; certainly there was
no opposition or lack of goodwill on the part of the British Government. In fact,
the three States have taken a certain step in this direction which merits closer
examination. A treaty of “ Arab Brotherhood and Alliance ” was concluded
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1936, to which the Yemen acceded in the
following year. The object of this treaty was <£ mutual co-operation and under
standing in regard to matters affecting the interests ” of the three Kingdoms,
with a view to safeguarding the integrity of their territories; and the spirit
actuating the contracting parties was based on “ the ties of the Islamic faith
and racial unity ” which bound them together. The Articles included a number
of undertakings for consultation and co-operation, but no attempt was made to
set up any new political machinery or any form of joint political or administrative
authority. This treaty (which has so far produced few tangible results in
practice) is a fair measure of the Arab desire for unity as envisaged by the Arabs
themselves. They have no desire to be absorbed in a single State or federation
of States. Each unit is tenacious of its own individuality and its own
independence. They may be willing to co-operate, when necessary, for a common
* It is interesting to note what Colonel T. E. Lawrence wrote on the subject in 19*28: —
“ When people talk of Arab confederation or empires, they talk fantastically. It will
be generations, I expect—unless the vital tempo of the blast is much accelerated—before
any two Arabic States join voluntarily. I agree their only future hope is that they should
join, but it must be a natural growing-together. Forced unions are pernicious: and politics,
in such things, should come after geography and economics. Communications and trade
must be improved before provinces can join.”
(See the Letters of T. E. Lawrence, page 577.)
[23330] b 2