Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎114r] (228/1144)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOYEflN]
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CONFIDENTIAL.
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November 1, 1944.
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Copy No;
Lord Moyne to Mr. Eden. — (Receivfd/fst ^p^yn^ber.)
Office of Minister ffesidenl" (jfL.E.),
My dear Secretary of State, Cairo, l$th October, 1944.
IN his despatch N^ 1V7Q 10 th Or-tnhpr Mr. Shone has analysed the
protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress and commented
oh the implications of its various clauses. In general I am in agreement with
the views expressed by His Majesty’s Minister. It may be of use if I add a few
comments on my own part, from the general Middle East point of view, based on
the interviews which the various delegates had with me during their stay in
Cairo, and on conversations with them which have been reported to me.
2. I should like in the first place to endorse the summing up of the outcome
of the conference given in paragraph 10 of Mr. Shone s despatch. Whether or
not the various resolutions are given immediate practical effect, the result of the
holding of the conference and of the formation of the “League ” or “ Common
wealth ” of Arab States cannot fail to tighten the ties joining the various States
of the Middle East. The existence and strength of these ties was shown by the
spontaneity of the reaction against the attempted French coup in the Lebanon in
November 1943. To this general feeling of community there has now been added
the machinery to give it concrete expression.
3. There is a further fact that emerges from a careful reading of the
protocol and from conversations with members of the conference. The protocol
envisages that the Arab world (or that part of it with which the protocol deals)
should have one orientation, and one only, towards the outside world. This feeling
has been expressed more and more in recent years, particularly in regard to the
partitions of the Middle East which were carried out after the last war. It is
now quite clear that the Arab States are convinced that there is not room for
two orientations, taking different parts of the Arab world in different directions.
The protocol expresses a growing sense of solidarity among the States composing
the “Arab Commonwealth,” and a realisation that the deflection of one part
of the area from the general line of development must affect the interests of the
whole.
4. There is little doubt that the direction envisaged at present is that of
co-operation with Great Britain. The Middle East group as a whole is willing,
and indeed anxious, to co-operate with Great Britain on a basis of independence
and free association. They believe that this will be to the mutual advantage of
both, since it gives the best guarantee on the one side of the security of the Arab
countries, and on the other side of the maintenance of British imperial
communications. All the indications are, however, that a policy of political
penetration on the eastern fringe of the Mediterranean, whether by Great Britain
herself, or by other Powers with the assistance or acquiescence of Great Britain,
would be interpreted as a threat to the essential interests of the whole “ Common
wealth.” This could not fail to have an effect upon the present inclination of the
Arab States to range themselves alongside of us, and might do so to such an
extent as to cause them to overcome the misgivings which they probably feel as
regards other possibilities and to look elsewhere for the support that they need.
In this connexion it is important to recall that the recent recognition of Syrian
and Lebanese independence by the U.S.S.R., which gave such satisfaction in the
Levant A geographical area corresponding to the region around the eastern Mediterranean Sea. States, is stated to be conditional on the two States not entering into an
agreement which would give a specially favoured or “ pre-eminent” position to
any one European Power. We must realise, in my view, that, if His Majesty’s
Government is forced to adopt local policies in any part of the Middle East which
are unacceptable to the majority of the Middle Eastern opinion, there is risk of the
whole orientation of the Arab bloc of countries being changed to some other
direction which might or might not be acceptable to us.
5. It is in this light that the special resolutions relating to the Lebanon and
Palestine (clauses IV and V) can be read. It is implied in the former that, if
there is any “ default” on the part of the Lebanon in allegiance to the objects
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