Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎98v] (197/1144)

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towards this unity they hope for our support No such an appeal from our
friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that
the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political
ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s Government for their part ^
will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.”
This undertaking you reiterated in February 1942, and it has become known as
“ The Eden Declaration.” At the time when it was made, many must have
wondered whether the Arab World would ever unite in any practical way or
direction, and still more whether they would be prepared to put themselves under
the guidance and leadership of Great Britain. In Iraq it certainly seemed most
unlikely; but, as you know, the change of feeling here during the past three and a
half years has been deep and marked, and it is true to say to-day that the
orientation towards Great Britain is popular here. The revolt of Rashid Ali
profoundly shocked the pride and confidence of most thinking Iraqis. With their
political instinct, whatever their feelings for Britain might then be. they were
quick to see that the revolt, had it been successful, would have ranged them on
the wrong side, and would have shattered their political hopes for perhaps a
generation.
6. Apart from that, the generous policy of His Majesty’s Government in
this country, both as regards the armistice terms and in many spheres since, has
done much to conciliate the people of Iraq besides causing a great impression in
other Arab States and particularly in Syria. The Atlantic Charter and similar
declarations of the statesmen of the United Nations have also created a new
feeling of confidence, here and throughout the Arab World, in Great Britain
and her willingness to help the Arabs, and her determination to stand by her
agreements.
7. It was this feeling, I am sure, which led the delegates to refer to the
White Paper in dealing with Palestine. The declaration was so phrased, I under
stand, because it was desired to find a form of words which would be not
unacceptable to Jamal Hussaini, who had actually, despite Amin Hussaini s
threats, initialled the White Paper (with trifling reservations), together with
Musa al Alami in Nuri Pasha’s house in May 1940. It was therefore felt
appropriate to make a reference to it. It seems to me that this acceptance of
Britain’s last official statement of policy by and on behalf of the so-called
extremist Palestine party, and its endorsement by the conference, is very
significant. It means on the one hand that the Palestinian Arabs are now
committed to an acceptance of the White Paper, and that we have the general
support of the Arab World for the policy it enshrined. But, on the other hand, it
means equally that any serious divergence from that policy will confront
His Majesty’s Government not only with the hostility of the Palestine Arabs, but
with that of all the signatories to the Alexandria Protocol. 'Jo them, the solution
of the Palestine problem on the basis of strictly limited Jewish immigration, like
the guarantee of Syria and the Lebanon, is an integral part of their scheme for
Arab Unity, a movement which we have undertaken to support. If we oppose, in
any important particular, the plan they have formulated, we shall at once be
accused of having gone back on our undertakings. We shall lose the confidence
that we have so laboriously built up over the past three years, and with it the
friendship which has proved such an asset to us.
8. The Arab World, like the Western World, finds it hard to co-operate on
cultural and economic matters, or the promotion of an idea, but an external threat
will unite them as it unites us. Thousands to whom the theory or ideal of Arab
Unity means little or nothing at all will enthusiastically support and share in
any action undertaken to protect or preserve Syria or Palestine from what is
conceived to be foreign aggression. Already, before the meeting of the
Alexandria Conference, the Arab World had shown surprising solidarity on two
occasions : first of all over the Lebanon crisis last November, and secondly over the
protests to the United States Congress against the ” Wagner Resolution ” early
this year.
9. There is, however, a profound difference between the reaction to the
incidents which have so far evoked, and astonishingly evoked, united Arab action,
and that to be expected should we adopt a policy contrary to the protocol.
Hitherto the Arabs have been our friends and have remonstrated as friends. If,
having assured the Arabs that their aspirations for unitv have our sympathetic
support, we now 7 oppose their official plan for its attainment, they will be our
friends no longer, and their opposition will be hostile and almost certainly
violent. At this moment feeling in Iraq on Palestine and Syria and the