Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎92v] (185/1144)

2.
'n
4c Egypt'took the lead ? actuated at the beginning largely
by reasons or internal politics. Nahas Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. wished to
strenthen his internal prestige by posing as a leader of the
Arab world, and King Farouk wished to strengthen his throne
by assuming a similar role. King Ibn Baud v/as from the beginning
opposed to the idea of Arab Union because he feared it would
mean a Hashemite domination of the Fertile Crescent with the-
consequent danger to his own position in the Hejaz* Hence his
determination to saboter any northern combination. The Lebanon '
was determined to preserve its complete independence in order
to avoid absorption in a Muslim Bloc, The attitudes of the
Lebanon and Ibn Baud led to the emasculation of the corporate
idea of the League and that of the Lebanon to the attenuation of
any executive function of the League, such as that involved in
compulsory arbitration, Ibn Baud and the Lebanon were kept within
the League largely by the influence of Egypt ? whose support in
the Council they regarded as a guarantee against the dangers which
they saw in it to their respective countries, Syria, after
aiming at the creation of a Greater Syria under ihe rule of
Damascus, acquiesced in the maintenance of the present
divisions of the western part of the Fertile Crescent. This
acquiescence was due to the fear that prosecution of the idea of
a Greater Syria would drive the Lebanon back into French arms,
Syrian acquiescence was no doubt also partly due to the
influence’ of Egypt^ whose assistance it needed for its
emancipation from France and for support Against Hashemite designs,
5. It is clear from all this that the influence of ' "
Egypt is a determining factor in the- present evolution of
Arab States. It is also clear that the Hashemites are being
relegated to the background, largely owing to Egyptian mani
pulation of their rivals. This is- hot a nappy state of affairs.
% are under obligations to the Hashemites for the r61e they ;
played in the last war and for their stabilising influence m
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Iraq. As things are at present in the Arab world,
it is not in our interest that Hashemite prestige should be
weakened in those two countries. I submit therefore, that our
efforts should be .directed against the isolation of the
Hashemites within the Arab League. If we make representations
to Ibn Saud against exclusive treaty making, we should make
similar representations to King Farouk and the Egyptian ..
Government. We can justify these representations by bur desire to
promote union among our Egypto-Arab friends and to remove the danger
that the present discords may wreck the League.
6., Arab Union has now been realised on paper by the'-
formation of an Egypto-Arab Bloc of independent units preserving
their often conflicting policies of the pre-League period. There
will no doubt be much friction between tne members of the League
and without our good offices these frictions are likely to end in
a relaxation, if not disintegration of the League. It may no doubt
be argued by some, on the principle of divide and rule, that such
disintegration would not be contrary-to our interests.,. While on
a short term view this is an arguable proposition, I feel that
you will agree that on a long term view it is to our advantage
that the Egypto-Arab world should not be distracted by internecine
conflicts which will expose it not only to British but also to
Russian penetration^ Moreover, the balkanisation of the Arab world
leads to material retrogression which militates to provoke dis
content in a large area lying across our lines of communications and
containing our vital oil supplies. I suggest, therefore,-that we
have a long term interest in promoting through Arab cooperation the
material welfare and the satisfaction of the sentimental aspirations
of these countries as far as our imperial interests permit. These
aspirations