Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎41v] (83/1144)

which
of
4. Egypt took the lead, actuated at the beginning largely
hy reasons- of internal politics. Nahas Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. wished t 0
strengthen his internal prestige by posing as a leader ol tne
Arab world, and King Parouk wishes to strengthen hls ,
by assuming a similar role. King Ibn 3aud was from the Deginnifc
opposed to the idea of Arab Union because he feareu
mean a Hashemite domination of the Fertile Crescent with the
consequent danger to his own position in the Hejaz. Hence his
determination to saooter any northern combination. -The Lebanoi
was determined to preserve its complete independence in oi’ aer
to avoid absorption in a Muslim Bloc. The attitudes of uhe
Lebanon and Ibn Saud -led to the emasculation of the corporate
idea of the League and that of the Lebanon to the attenuation of
any executive function of the League,- such as that involved in
compulsory arbitration. Ibn Saud and the -Lebanon were kept within
the League largely by the influence of E^ypt-, whose support in
the Council they regarded as a guarantee* against the dangers
they saw- in it to their respective countries. Syria, alter
aiming at the creation of a Greater Syria under the rule ol
Damascus, acquiesced in the maintenance 01 the present
aivisions of the western part of the Fertile Crescent. -his
acquiescence was due to the fear that prosecution of the idea
a Greater Syria would drive the Lebanon back into Irench arms.
Syrian acquiescence was no doubt also partly due to the
influence of Egypt, whose assistance it needed for its
emancipation from France and for support against Hashemite designs.
* 5. It is clear from all this that the influence of
^vot is a determining factor in the present evolution oi^
Arab States. It is also clear that the Hashemites are being
relegated to the background, largely owing to Egyptian mani
pulation of their rivals. This is not a haopy state ol el*airs.
Vie are under obligations to the Hashemites for the role tu.ey
placed in the last war and lor -their stabilising inlluence m
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Iraq. As things are at present in the Arab worxd,
it'is not in our interest that,Hashemite prestige should be
weakened in those two countries. I submit therefore, that our
efforts should be directed against the isolation of the
T Uashemites within the Arab League. If we make representations
to ibn Saud against exclusive treaty making, we^should make
similar representations to King Farouk and the Egyptian ^
Government". We can justify these representations by our desire to
promote union among our Egypto-Arab friends and to remove the aanger
that the present discords may wreck the League.
6 A v *ab Union has now been realised m paper oy the
f o-tt tion of an Egypto-Arab Bloc ol independent units preserving
tPi"- of ten coni lifting policies of the ore-League period. There
will no doubt be much friction between the members of the League
ana without our good offices these frictions are likely to end m
a relaxation, if not disintegration of the League. It may noaoubt
be argued by some, on the principle of divide and rule, that such
disintegration would not be contrary to our interests, swhile^on
a'short term view this is an arguable proposition, I reel that
vou will agree that on a long term view it fs to our advantage -
that the Egypto'-Arab world should not be distracted by internecine
conflicts which will expose it not only to British but also to
Russian penetration. Moreover, the balkanisation of the Arab woiId
leads to material retrogression which militates to provoke ais
content in a large area lying across our lines of communications and
containing our vital oil supplies. I suggest, therefore, tha w
have a long term interest in promoting through Arab cooperation the
material welfare and the satisfaction of the sentimental aspirations
of these countries as far as our imperial interests permit. ^hese
/aspirations