Coll 30/9(2) 'Admin. Reports of the Persian Gulf - 1945 -' [‎27r] (53/1148)

was a Major-General his departure freed the commanders of the Army
and Gendarmerie from the restraint that his higher rank placed
upon them,
8* Brigadier Khosrudad who commands the Ger.darmerxC is o rogue
but doubtless no worse th<-n any other Persian officer simx.iorly
placed (it is said in his excuse that he is constantly su^ect to
pressure to send greater and greater pickings to Tehran)• From
our point of view he has the advantage of being pleasant
with and apparently anxious to co-opernte. The tribes' objection
to him is that he has been in Fars so xong that he knows not only
all the ropes but all the tricks as well*
9. In colonel Himmat the army has an officer of ability, out
standing honesty and devotion to his duties and a reputation for
courage in the field. His extensive knowledge and experience of
Pars and of its tribes stand him in good stead. There is an armed
truce between him and the Qashqai but the tribes without exception
speak of Himmat with respect.
10. The (^ashqai in particular stood to gain by the general pardon
of the tribes in Pars announced by the Sheh but the effect of this
act of clemency was overshadowed by the turn of events in the north.
11 . The Khamseh, who are the smaller of the two larger groups of
tribes in Pars, have been well-behaved. Under their new supervisor,
the Governor of Fasa,(a relative of Qavara ul Mulk) their conditions
of life and general outlook have improved. By this good handling
of Khamseh affairs the Supervisor has built hiraself such a reputation
that he claims he could disarm and settle the Khamseh without any
difficulty. It is a pity that the Government are unable or not
sufficiently interested to produce the money to cover the cost of
settling the Khemseh and so net only make a start in tackling the
question of the migratory tribes but also make it sagaciously. The
Khamseh are not rich encuvh to settle themselves. Qavam ul Mulk
might be induced to put up the necessary money but the ob^e ction
to turning to Qavam for assistance is that it would strengthen the
hold on the tribe that he has particularly been able to resume
through the appointment and good work of the supervisor.
12. The Qashqai, who are the other main tribal group in Pars, but
greater and richer than the Khamseh, have had their loyalty to their
leader, Nasir Khan Qashqai, assailed but managed to maintain it
unimpaired. The first attack on laser's position came from his
uncld Ali Khan, his uncle's two son® Chengiz and Amir Mansur and
from the sons of another uncle, Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Jthtesham. These severally
went out in tribal country but seem to have enlisted little or no
support and so could whip up no real challenge to Naser's
authority. But Naser, who, wrongly attributed their activities to
spurrings from the Government and from beyyed Zia seems to have
been sufficiently moved to consider buying them off.
13. A second and much more serious challenge to his position arose
from Naser's sending an impetuous telegram to the Prime Minister
saying that in disgust at the Government's suppression of newspapers,
parties, associations and freedom in general he renounced his leader
ship of the ^ashqai. Naser's telegram gave tne general impression
that he had gone over to the Russians because the newspapers and
parties suppressed were Tudeh. But jthe later corrected this impress
ion and quickly changed his mind about leading the Qashqai &hen his
uncle iili Khan said he would assume <harge in Naser's place. ^ a f® r
was obliged to beat up the kalantars to wire Tehran to say that they
would have none other than him. His telegram was a further source
of embarrassment to Naser when the situation in Azeroa..Jan started
boiling up and he was then at some pains to convince Tehran of his
loyalty.
14. In general the conditions of the Qashqai show improvement.
/ The