Coll 6/91 'Saudi Arabia. Policy of H.M.G. Qn. of credits and guarantee of assistance to Ibn Saud.' [‎311v] (623/680)

4
PZ
Enclosure 2.
Copy of Letter addressed to Sir R. Bullard by Mr. J. W. Wall.
Dear Sir Reader, Riyadh, November 3, 1939.
IBN SAUD talked a good deal about Russia during your visit, and in
general, I think, gave the impression that he considered Russia a false friend to
Germany and no danger, directly, to the Allies. This view was also expressed, as
far as I can remember, in the Ministry of Information’s telegram sent to us shortly
after the Russians entered Poland. Ibn Saud has now changed his mind and has
decided that the Russians are a menace to the Arab world. As far as I can gather,
this change of mind is due to Russia’s determined and rapid advances in the
Baltic area and to Turkey’s apparent failure (in Ibn Saud’s view) to declare
herself prepared to stand in the way of any Russian aggression.
2. In any case, after some days of brooding, he has hatched the enclosed
statement, containing views which he considers of great importance and which he
wishes me to transmit to you for consideration by His Majesty’s Government as
quickly as possible. As he offered to send my letter by special car, and as the
labour of cyphering and decyphering so long a statement might well make the
communication of it by telegraph less speedy than by car, I have sent the statement
in original, together with my memorandum of his conversation—which, I hope,
amplifies and explains certain points of the statement.
3. I have made no comment on the matter, confining myself, in a later
discussion with Yusuf \asin alone, to clearing up some of the Arabic expressions
i used and making sure I had got the King’s meaning. Ibn Saud wishes me to say
that he is prepared to give all explanations and amplifications that His Majesty’s
i Government may ask for. He hopes, too, as Yusuf Yasin repeated to me, that
His Majesty’s Government will not think he is grinding his own axe and discount
his estimate of the seriousness of the danger he apprehends on that account.
4. My personal impression is that he really believes in the danger he
describes. He is quite sincere : the force and clarity of his expressions left me in
no doubt about that. He toned down his badawy aiccent and took pains to make
me understand every sentence. He used strong language about the Russians
(“ dogs,” “ accursed ones,” “ this vile Government ”).
5. Though my memorandum does not lay much stress on the “material
assistance which Ibn Saud would like His Majesty’s Government to give the
Arabs, this is undoubtedly of great importance to their minds. Yusuf Yasin said
to me last night: Tou grant Turkey a loan of £60 million (or whatever it is) in
return for fair words, while we, the Arabs, who could and would do far more for
you than Turkey promises, you don’t give us 60 gurush ! ”
Enclosure 3.
Memorandum by Mr. J. W. Wall.
IN a private interview at 9 a.m. on the 3rd November (His Majesty Yusuf
Yasin and J. W. Wall only present) the King~3eveioped a point of view he had
outlined to me in the public interview the day before, and handed me a state-
ment( 2 ) which he had dictated the night before.
2. As genei al pieface, he said that his opinions were naturally based on the
information available to him. His Majesty’s Government had, of' course wider
sources of information, and they would judge his opinions by the light of what
they knew about the present situation and its probable developments.
3. The Arabs’ concern with European affairs arises from the fact that the
necessities of modern mechanical civilisation have made the Arabs dependent on
European skill and resources.
4. Of the three European Powers with interests in the Arab world Britain
is recognised by all the Arabs as being the most important. French influence is
( 2 ) Enclosure 1.