File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy' [‎93r] (194/498)

ke lull responsibility for controlliasr the triffle i„ h
other Powers should be <ri ven , l^ r * u m ‘'"i 88 r «g"
libition of to !“der S tand that w,
undertake full
that the
tho prohibition of exports as'applying no “'an to the
covered by the Convention. 0 Ule
ions, and
e regard
territories
Africa.-- As
regards
Afr
prohibited area two regions in'the^tortLaXT'l ‘ 0 iuclud 1 e ' vi ? ii ' 1 tlje
<lraft Additional Act, viz., Morocco and the SpaniXooldT'.iast by - lhe
difficulty is anticipated in either case. 3ast ‘ seiJ0,,s
8 . r n
ie
Iquestion was discussed of making the sale of arms &c a
<,ocernmcnt monopoly conhned to the administrations of the smnatorv
Powers, within the prohibited area Mr. Read pointed out that a suction
on these lines had been made in 1898 in connection with the liquo%affic
but had been abandoned as impracticable. A similar proposal, in remtrd to
arms and ammunition, was submitted by the German delegate to the
[Irussels Arms Conference in 1908, but was not incorporated fn the draft
Additional Act. I tie proposal was criticised by the British delegates, in a
despatch to the foreign Office, on the following grounds
( 1 ) that it constituted a totally new departure and might be difficult to
reconcile with the general principles of commercial policy laid
down by His Majesty s Government;
(2) that Chambers of Commerce might hnd reason to complain that
while the sale of arms was being restricted in British territories,
other Governments were selling more freely, and that British
merchants were Thus being placed at a disadvantage ; and
('B a complicated machinery, throwing an undue burden on district
officers, would be required to give eifect to the proposal.
Much has happened id the last nine years to modify public opinion in
regard to State control over industry, and the objections raised in 1908
would not necessarily be of equal force at the present day. But there are
other practical objections to the establishment of a system of Government
monopolies in the prohibited areas, arising, e.g., out of the weakness of such
states as Liberia, the special conditions prevailing in some of the British
West African Colonies, Ac.
In all the circumstances there seems no necessity to revive this proposal,
as the object in view can be adequately secured by a system of effective State
control on the lines of the draft Additional Act with the necessary amend
ments, provided it is strictly administered and the responsibilities of the
signatory Powers are honestly discharged.
9. It is not proposed to alter the provision in Article 1 of the draft
Additional Act which authorises the transit of arms, Ac., through the
territory of a signatory Power in occupation of the coast into that of
another signatory (or adherent) Power occupying inland territory without
direct access to the sea, provided the goods are certified bj’ the Head of the
State in the inland country to be required for (iovernment purposes, and not
destined for sale. The bearing of this clause on the Abyssinian question is
discussed in paragraphs 0 and 7 of the Minutes of the third meeting. The
substitution of the “ Head of the State ” for the vaguer 4t Government ” of
the Brussels Act of 1890—fixing as it does individual responsibility on the
ruler of Abyssinia—is undoubtedly a step towards more ellective control.
Sir H. Ale Mahon instanced the case "of Afghanistan where the Amir’s personal
certificate is required for the importation of arms, Ac., from India, and has
in practice proved hitherto an adequate safeguard against improper
demands. But the circumstances of the two countries difler in material
points ; and it seems clear that, in addition to the proposed international
Convention, some special arrangements affecting Abyssinia, such as those
recently formulated by Mr. Thesiger (see paragraph 5 of the Minutes of the
third meeting), will be necessary in order to cope with the alaiming
situation created by the wholesale influx of arms and ammunition into the
country. The alternative of omitting the transit clause, bv which alone
the Abyssinian Government is enabled to procure arms foi its o\\ n legitimate
purposes, does not seem a practicable one.