File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy' [‎88v] (185/498)

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micht in default of a previous understand,ng between the Powers nRested
n T e new State upset anv international arrangements for the control of the
arms traffic S.’r 11. McMahon explained confidentially the nature of the
agreements concluded by the Entente Powers definmg them future spheres
of nl nonce in Arabia and Asiatic Turkey Stated briefly, bnt.sh ,n luence
will predominate on the Red Sea coast, and wd contmue, as heretofore, to
be paramount in the Gulf of Aden, and on the Maskat. and Persian Gn f
Uoral. In the interior we shall be in a position to deal with the Arab
Ohio fa of the whole peninsula south of Palestine. French interests will
predominate in Syria on the Mediterranean coast.
8 The arms traffic question is bound to engage the attention of 1‘ ranee
in her new sphere. She is likely, for example to entertain projects of
commercial development which may well excite the opposition of the loca
Arabs—an opposition which will be formidable in proportion to the growth o
tribal armament. In any case she cannot wish to see herself surrounded
bv lanm numbers of semi-civilised tribesmen, armed with modern rifles
and furnished with unlimited supplies of ammunition It will clearly be
to her interest, to check the trade. This appears to afford the basis of a
reciprocal understanding with the French Government, bir II. McMahon
even su^ested that, if France continued obdurate on the Jibuti question, it
would beTadvisable to connive at the establishment of arms depots by our
own traders, say, one in Fgypt and another on the ^Vest African coast,
from which we could threaten, or appear to threaten, those regions from
which the French are particularly anxious to exclude the traffic, lie
considered that a threat of this kind would be more likely than anything
else to bring the French Government to reason. We should be in a position
t0 S ay to them “ Close your depots and we will close ours. We are both
“ faced with a common danger, which can only be averted by uniform action
« b as ed upon a common policy.” The Sub-Committee agreed generally, with
the exception of the Colonial Office representative who thought that, in West
Africa, at any rate, the establishment of an arms depot of the kind suggested
was out of the question. The view that the question of French interests in
Syria had introduced a new and important counter into the game, of which
effective use might be made, was accepted.
9. It is to he observed, however, that the Syrian question has an interest
for Great Britain as well as for France, and that we ourselves are seriously
concerned in preventing the influx into Syria ol large quantities of arms and
ammunition, which might find their way through Arabia into Persia and
Afghanistan. Communications in Arabia are already beginning to open
out, and it is understood that Medina is at the present time being provisioned
to some extent from Koweit and the Shat-el-Arab, via Nejd. Reports also
indicate that the Euphrates route is being regularly used by the Turks
for the conveyance of troops and arms. As has already been remarked,
mere difficulties of transport and communications, however serious, are not
sufficient to check a trade in which the profits are so enormous as are those
of gim-running.
10. Turning to the more general aspects of the question, the
Sub-Committee considered that an endeavour should be made at the
Peace Conference to obtain an undertaking from all the belligerent
Governments (including that of Germany and the other enemy countries)
not to dispose by sale, in any circumstances whatever, of the surplus stocks
of arms and ammunition remaining in their possession at the close of the
war. In making this proposal llis Majesty’s Government might emphasise
its importance as an indispensable step towards the attainment of an object
common to all the belligerents, viz., the prevention of future wars. It is
to be assumed that this object will figure prominently in the discussions at
the Conference ; and it appears desirable to place in the forefront, among the
methods of securing its attainment, the vital necessity of restricting the free
distribution of modern arms and ammunition. The policy of permanent
international co operation in this matter, if once firmly established, should go
far towards securing the world against the recurrence of incidents fraught
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