File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy' [‎85r] (178/498)

G. I liese measures, coupled with the success achieved by the naval
blockade, seem to have brought the French Government to a more reason
able frame of mind. At any rate, after some rather protracted negotiations,
an agreement was eventually reached and embodied in Notes interchanged
between bn E. Grey and the hrench Ambassador on the 4th February 1914
hy which, ill return for the British Government buying up the French
dealers stocks lying in the Maskat warehouse, France “ renounced the right
„ ol . voking, on behalf of French citizens and protected persons, the
ll nv ' leges <-onlewed on these persons by the Treaty of 1814, between
hranoo and Maskat, m so far as such privileges and immunities are
opposed to the regulations and laws for the prevention of the contraband
t,a ' je 1,1 arm * an(l ammunition in the dominions of the Sultan of Maskat.”
<. I li< position at Maskat is t hus that the difficulty caused bv the French
tiea1\ ol 1 <S41 has been got rid of ; that the hrench arms dealers have been
bought out , and that the Sultan has heen induced to regulate the traffic
on satisfactory lines. But it must be borne in mind that we still depend, for
t|ie continued restriction of the Maskat traffic, on our power of keeping the
Multan up to his engagements : and that our locus sLundi for effective inter
vention, in the event of failure on the Sultan s part, is still qualified by the
Anglo-hlench Declaration ol. IS(i2, which affords the brench Government
plausible grounds for objecting to any action savouring of an infringement
of the ” independence ” of Maskat.
8. 1 he Sultans present position is one of great difficulty. Ilis action in
restricting the arms traffic was bitterly resented by a large number of his
own subjects, and was unquestionably one of the main contributory causes of
the rebellion which broke out in Oman in 1913, and which still remains
unsuppressed. Sultan Turki, who was personally responsible for the
warehouse policy, died in October 1913, soon after the rebellion had
assumed serious dimensions; but his successor, Sultan Taimur, in spite of
several attempts at negotiation with the rebel leaders, has not succeeded in
re-establishing his position, and his authority at the present moment is
virtually restricted to the coastal area in which his capital is situated. In
the interior the rebels are masters of the situation. British Indian troops
were sent to the Sultan’s assistance in July 1913, and have subsequently
been reinforced more than once. But their role has always been confined to
the defence of the capital and coast towns : and though, in January 1915,
they repulsed with severe loss a rebel attack on the capital, they have never
been permitted to follow the enemy into the interior. At the present time
the British garrison in Maskat and the neighbourhood amounts to just over
1,000 Indian infantry, including 1^ British officers.
9. In the course of the discussion Admiral Slade urged that, with a view
to securing permanent and effective control over the arms traffic at Maskat,
the question of placing a British official in charge of the Sultan’s customs
should be revived. This question lias frequently been discussed in the past;
but the Sultan’s amour propre stood in the way, and for various reasons it
lias never been thought advisable to press the proposal on bis acceptance. Its
desirability, however, has been generally recognised. At present the Sultan
farms out his customs, and there can be little doubt that the revenue derived
from them would be substantially increased if they were placed under proper
management. Admiral Slade pointed out that control o\ei the Sultan s
customs - his one important source of revenue would carry with it an
influence upon the general administration ol. Maskat, falling little shoit of a
British protectorate over the country. The first step, in the opinion of the
Sub-Committee, would be to obtain from the fiench Goa eminent the
removal of all restrictions upon our freedom of action imposed by the
Declaration of 1862 (see paragraph 7); this obtained, they considered
that, given the conditions existing in Maskat, it would be iiecessai\,
if the arrangement contemplated was to be (ffectrve, to maintain m the
country sonic permanent armed force, under British control, in order to
preserve order and to support the Sultan’s executive authority. In a icw ol