'Aden Policy' [‎187r] (7/8)

riendly intercourse and co-operation with the Chiefs and Headmen, of
gmng them support by the grant of small subsidies, of interfering not at
V ", mana ^ ement of the tribe, while endeavouring to prevent
intertribal fighting by tendering cur good offices in the settlement of inter-
n )a quanels. That is the policy which in Baluchistan, while preserving
t ic autonomy of the tribes, has replaced chaos by peace, order, and
prosperity. Ihere has been a battle royal between these two policies on the
I ndian frontier for the past^ thirty years. The latter has won the day, and
has been successfully applied on the northern frontier, in Hunza, Nagar,
I)ir, Swat, and Chitral, while it was the hope of its successful application,
so far as possible, on the Punjab frontier, that led to the formation of the
Punjab frontier Province. I speak with knowledge, for after fighting the
battle of the policies on the frontier I was able to watch its progress from
the Foreign Department under three successive Viceroys. It is the latter
policy which the Government of India are adopting in the Aden Hinterland.
To my mind there is no question of its superiority to the other policy
provided it is properly supervised. We have object lessons in the results of
both all along the Indian frontier. Twenty years of the one means no
progress, but rather retrogression, for meanwhile the tribes become better
armed and more unruly. Twenty years of the other means the growth of a
new and more settled generation disinclined to fight, and accustomed to
peaceful pursuits. The Aden Hinterland is especially well suited for the
application of the latter policy, for, as in Baluchistan, the people have an
aristocratic form of government and obey their Chiefs. The area,
too, of the country is small, while the population is sparse and very
easily controlled. In fact, compared with the difficulties we have suc
cessfully accomplished elsewhere, the problem at Aden seems to be a
simple one. We have a fairly quiet people to deal with, and have
Treaty relations with their Chiefs, who are in our pay. Our objects are to
encourage good government, to keep open the trade routes, to discourage
intertribal quarrels, to control the arms trade by pressure on the Chiefs, to
prevent raids across the frontier, and to keep in friendly relations with the
local Turkish officials across the border. For the rest, the tribes should be
left to govern themselves. While, therefore, reiterating the importance
of interfering as little as possible, I w T ould allow the Government of India to
continue their present policy and, at any rate for the present, to keep their
Political Officer and the troops at D’thala. Otherwise, as experience else
where teaches us is probable, we may bring about the very position we
desire to avoid, and be foTTGd into punitive expeditions to put down tribal
disorder. The expeditions no doubt would not be serious ones, for the
Aden tribes are not formidable. There is no comparison between Afghanistan
and D’thala, and very little analogy, it seems to me, between Somaliland
and the comparatively settled country round Aden. But expeditions are to
be avoided, if possible, and I think we are far more likely to avoid them by
continuing our present policy than by withdrawing altogether from the
Hinterland.
As to the proposed railway to Nobat Dakin, I would treat the Abdali
Sultan with perfect frankness. We don’t want the line; but if he wants it
and is prepared to pay for it I would not throw obstacles in the way. The
Sultan probably knows little about the cost of constructing railways and of
their upkeep. I would offer him the best advice we can give him. If our