'Aden Policy' [‎185r] (3/8)

3
says “ the general health of the civil population at Tawahi and Maala is
reported to have been good.’ r Jhe European General Hospital’s figures
were for daily average attendance :—
Sick.
1904-05.
1903-04.
1901-02.
In patients
103
1.5*5
Percentage not given,
but the number of
patients 3,182 ex-
Out door patients
391
40-05
needed that of 3,120
in 1904-05.
The impression left on me in looking over the reports, is that the
native troops were more unhealthy at D’thala than at Aden, and the
Europeans rather healthier at Aden last year than in previous years.
The admissions of natives into hospital considering the strength, 670 men,
were the highest for years, while there were only 906 cases of Europeans
admitted out of a strength of 1,367« The European death-rate was higher
but not so high as in 1898. These figures, however, require scrutiny, as
some deaths may be due to active service; but, after all, compared with
the so-called healthy station of Poona, the death-rate at Aden calls for no
special remark. With a reduction of the Aden garrison to its former
strength an improvement should occur.
ii. As regards the training of troops at Aden, no complaints used
to be made, since the country between the rock and Sheikh Othman is
perfectly flat. If the garrison were reduced to its former numbers, which
were considered sufficient for the fortress, there should be no difficulty in
training them. This however is a military question.
iii. As regards the Naval policy of the Admiralty and the need for
communication with the interior, the argument seems almost desperate.
But at any rate if we were at peace with Turkey there would be no need
for a garrison at D’thala, and if we were at war a thousand men there would
not secure us the supplies needed.
iv. As to the arms traffic, it is certain that a garrison at D’thala can
have no manner of influence upon the trade considering the long line of
frontier and. the Turkish landing places at Sheikh Said and north of it
Experience has proved that we cannot check the arms traffic without an
honest international agreement, and that we can secure neither in the Persian
Gulf nor in the Red Sea.
IV.
4. There remains the question of the Sultan of Abdali s railway. Our
hands have been somewhat forced in this. The Abdali Sultan is very poor,
and could never have thought of a railway unless it had been suggested to
him. It is, however, certain that unless we allow it to run to the port of
Aden no one will dream of making it. We have nothing to gain tmd much
to lose by giving such a permission. If ever we were obliged to defend Aden
in a war in which Turkey was against us, the railway might possibly even
help our enemies. The argument of trade is surely a weak one. The