'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME II.' [94v] (195/660)
The record is made up of 1 volume (323 folios). It was created in 1924. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
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160 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
country. In regard to this it should be noted that General
Delamain’s opinion as to the physical condition of the men
of his own brigade on their arrival at Kut makes it clear
that the exhaustion of the men was not a contributory
factor to the occupation of Kut. There is no doubt, says
General Delamain, that the men, British and Indian, of the
16th Infantry Brigade were quite fit to continue the retire
ment after one day’s halt at Kut, and he is of opinion that the
men of the other brigades were probably just as fit.
General Townshend says also in his book that he realised the
disadvantage and danger of shutting up his force in an en
trenched camp; but if he did not hold Kut he considered that
the Turks, by moving down the Shatt al Hai, could advance on
the weak garrison of Nasiriya and on Basra, and, thus turning
the British position on the Tigris, force the evacuation of
Mesopotamia. It is necessary here to emphasise the fact
that, at this time, Generals Nixon and Townshend were both
confident that the coming reinforcements would, when con
centrated, experience no great difficulty in effecting a
junction with the force at Kut. The only difference between
their respective opinions was that, while at first General
Townshend expected that the junction would be carried out
within a month, General Nixon considered that it would
probably take twice that time. As shown in the preceding
chapter, when General Townshend realised that it might take
two months to effect his relief, he proposed a withdrawal from
Kut; and only abandoned this proposal when he understood
that Shaikh Saad would be the forward concentration point
of the relieving force.
He considered and rejected the idea of falling back to hold
the Turkish position astride the Tigris at Es Sinn. It was
some nine miles in length, and therefore, in his opinion, too
large for his force to occupy. Moreover, he says that he
could not, in the time available, remove there the necessary
large amount of stores, ammunition, and supplies from Kut,
without which his force could not remain at Es Sinn; and he
knew it would be impossible to get what was required in time
from Amara, the nearest depot of supply.*
* It is questionable whether there was then in Amara a sufficient reserve
of supplies to have fed General Townshend’s force, and, owing to lack of
steamers, supplies would have to be sent up in mahailas. In favourable
circumstances mahailas would take about a week to get up from Amara to
Es Sinn, but under unfavourable conditions they might take double that
period. From Basra to Amara they would take from two to four weeks
according to the weather.
About this item
- Content
The volume is the second volume of an official government publication compiled at the request of the Government of India, and under the direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, by Brigadier-General Frederick James Moberly. The volume was printed and published at His Majesty's Stationery Office, London.
The contents provide a narrative of the operations of 1914-1918 in Mesopotamia, based mainly on official documents.
The volume is in one part, entitled, 'Part III. The First Campaign for Baghdad', and consists of the following fourteen chapters:
- The Decision to Advance to Baghdad
- Commencement of the Advance Towards Baghdad
- The Battle of Ctesiphon - the First Day's Operations
- Battle of Ctesiphon (Continued) and the British Retirement to Kut
- The Decision to Hold Kut and British Policy Consequent on the Failure to Reach Baghdad
- The Siege of Kut: First Phase (December 1915)
- Commencement of the Relief Operations
- The Action of Shaikh Saad
- The Action of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. and the First Attack on Hanna
- Operations up to the End of February, 1916
- The Second Attempt to Relieve Kut; the Attack on the Dujaila Redoubt
- The Third Attempt to Relieve Kut; the Successful Advance to and First and Second Attacks on Sannaiyat
- The Last Attempt at Relief; Bait Isa and Sannaiyat
- The Siege of Kut; the Last Stages
The volume also includes nine maps, entitled:
- The Middle East
- Lower Mesopotamia
- Map 8 - The Tigris from Kut al Amara to Baghdad
- Map 9 - The Battle of Ctesiphon
- Map 10 - The affair of Umm at Tubul
- Map 11 - The defence of Kut al Amara
- Map 12 - The fort at Kut; with special reference to the Turkish attack on 24th December 1915
- Map 13 - River Tigris between Ali Gharbi and Shumran
- Map 14 - The action at Shaikh Saad
- Map 15 - The action of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows.
- Map 16 - The first attack on Hanna; 21st January 1916
- Map 17 - The attack on the Dujaila Redoubt, 8th March 1916
- Map 18 - To illustrate Tigris Corps Operation Order No. 26, dated 6th March 1916
- Map 19 - To illustrate operations between 10th March and end of April 1916
- Map 20 - The action of Bait Isa on 17th and 18th April 1916, and the attack on Sannaiyat 22nd April 1916
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (323 folios)
- Arrangement
The volume contains a list of contents (folios 6-10), a list of maps and illustrations (folio 11), appendices (folios 254-290), an index (folios 291-312), and eleven maps in a pocket attached to the inside back cover (folios 314-324).
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the inside front cover with 1 and terminates at the inside back cover with 325; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio.
Pagination: the volume also contains an original printed pagination sequence.
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- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME II.' [94v] (195/660), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/15/66/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100045738548.0x0000c4> [accessed 5 February 2025]
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- Reference
- IOR/L/MIL/17/15/66/2
- Title
- 'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME II.'
- Pages
- front, back, spine, edge, head, tail, front-i, 2r:3r, 3r, 4r:70v, 72r:79r, 160v, 80r:102v, 104r:160r, 161r, 313v, 161v:281v, 283r:313v, back-i
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence