‘Russo-Turkish War, 1877. Operations in Asia.’ [‎41r] (15/42)

of artillery (for General LazarefFs force and the main body from Hadjivell
were co-operating after the fall of the Aulia-Tepeh), Mukhtar Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. personally
visited the trenches of the several positions in succession and was himself
among the last to quit them when the failure of his exhortations and
remonstrances left him no other alternative. It is a remarkable fact that the
Turkish troops in this movement to the rear, though losing their formation and
retiring in great disorder, retained every man his rifle and never once
quickened their pace beyond a walk though harrassed by the enemy’s
projectiles, until they reached Wezin-Keui. There, however, after a last vain
attempt on the part of Mukhtar Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. to make a stand, the contagion spread
to the assembled ra' ble of soldiers of all arms, muleteers, and drivers, and the
retreat took the form of a precipitate flight over a tract of eight miles which
intervened up to the gates of Kars amid the explosion of ammunition boxes
and other accidents incidental to a panic. In the case of a force composed for
the very most part of raw levies, without other subaltern officers to mould the
battalions than serjeants promoted from the Nizam regiments to the command
of companies, and devoid also of any kind of organization, that a serious defeat
should lead to a debandade is, of course, to be expected, but in this instance,
the loss of the Aulia-Tepeh involving the discomforture of 4 battalions only,
could hardly be termed a serious defeat. The Turks, it must be remembered,
were everywhere fighting behind entrenchments—their strong point—on
positions well chosen for mutual defence, and had they held them with equal
tenacity, the retreat of the troops on the Aladja Dagh—some SO battalions,
including 5 battalions stationed on a hill to the south of the Nalhend-Tepeh—
must not only have been fully secured, but their appearance on the field,
covered by the guns of those positions, might have retrieved the day by
concentrating a preponderant force against the Russian Division operating
from Digor. Such an issue was only possible of course by dint of sheer hard
fighting against the overwhelming numbers the Russians brought into the
field on this day.”
The total force engaged on the Russian side on this day was 65 battalions,
71 squadrons and sotnias, and 254 guns, whereas on the Turkish side there
were 76 battalions,* 84 field and mountain guns, some 1,500 regular and 2,500
irregular cavalry.
Owing to casualties and desertion, however, the average complement of
the Turkish battalion, we are informed on the best authority, had actually
fallen below 300 rank and file, whereas the Russian infantry recently recruited
from the interior and reinforced by two whole Divisions (the 40th and 1st
Grenadier Divisions) as well as by the concentration of all available troops from
the right and left wings as Ardahan and Igdyr, not only surpassed the former in
number in the field, but averaged in each battalion not less than 650 bayonets,
thus giving the Grand Duke some 42,250 bayonets and 254 guns against
Mukhtar Pasha’s 21,900 infantry! and 84 guns.
The preponderance of artillery on the Russian side in this battle is
remarkable as not only outnumbering the Turkish guns as 3 to 1, but being in
addition mostly of a much heavier calibre.J It was, moreover, worked on this
day with a precision and activity which had not distinguished it on former occa
sions, and, as was remarked by an independent eye-witness on the Russian side,
instead of confining itself to a shell fire at impossible ranges—where neither
accuracy nor effect could be expected and where its fire was soon masked by the
advance of its own troops—moved forward this time in support of the infantry and
materially co-operated towards the general result of the day. It is also worthy of
remark that whereas the Turkish artillery fire was almost exclusively one of
common shell with percussion fuzes, the Russian gunners recognised on this
occasion the superiority of shrapnel fired with time fuzes, and used it in large
quantities with great effect.^
The actual losses of the Turks in killed and wounded on this occasion
were probably very slight in comparison with the scale of the engagement * * * §
* Including the garrison of Kars—some 7 or 8 battalions.
t About 19,650 bayonets, deducting the garrison of Kars. , , . ,
+ The Russian 9-pr. fires a common shell weighing 24 lbs. 5 oz. (filled), and a shrapnel shell
weighing 22 lbs. 9 oz. (filled). . , i „ „„
§ Probably owing to their moving on this occasion to within effective shrapnel range.