‘The Russo-Turkish War. 1877. Operations in Europe.’ [‎14v] (28/66)

28
Jaa. 1877.
Feb. 1877.
Probably, by degrees, official information may come in, but in the mean
time there seems no other course open than to put down the most apparently
reasonable reports, rejecting what seems exaggerated or improbable.
According to one of the former, the total strength of the Turkish forces was
044,512 men. . . „ ^ A « .v
40,000 men were at Nisch on the frontier of Servia, to be ready lor the
termination of the armistice.
Large contingents had been drawn from Syria, about 60,000 men.
The latest January intelligence, sent from Eustchuk, estimated the
Turkish forces in Bulgaria at 146,000 men, distributed in 184 battalions of
Nizams, 76 of Redifs, and 21,000 Cavalry, with 292 guns. The effective
stiength of the battalions of Nizams and Eedifs was given at about 500 men,
all told, and this list is'exclusive of irregular troops and reservists who were
still arriving. It was calculated that the 1st February would see the Turkish
Army concentrated and deployed along the line of the Danube^ from the
Sulina mouth and Tultscha to Lorn Palanka, and even beyond Widdin.
Some details are given of the Turkish Army as seen in February by an
English officer, who described it as armed, the Infantry with Martini-Henrys,
Sniders, and muzzle-loaders, and the Cavalry with flint pistols and Remington
carbines.
In February, the Turks were described as quite unprepared for war, and
remarkably blind as to their own deficiencies. A paper force of 370,000 men
on the Danube, on which the War Office relied, is reported to mean a real
force of barely 8,000 men north of the Balkans, including Saitchar and
Widdin, and scarcely a man to the south of them.
Intelligence, subsequent to but less reliable than the above, alluded to
much moving about and shifting of the troops on the line of the Danube.
Schumla and Widdin had received considerable reinforcements, and the force at
the latter place was detailed at 57 battalions of Infantry, two regiments of
Cavalry and 82 guns, and at the former at 28 battalions, one regiment of
Cavalry and eight batteries. The Turks were making great efforts to get their
whole army into line by the middle of the month. There was a great scarcity
of horses for transport service. The Mustahfiz, or last Militia levy, were also
now for the first time being called out, but they were without arms or
equipment. Measures, however, were being taken to supply this deficiency.
It was also resolved to call out the “ Tcherkesse but only at the last
moment—and to employ them against the anticipated Russian advance by the
Dobrudscha.
Information, dated the middle of February, from Vienna, estimates the
Turkish Army at 100,000 men, and 60,000 in the field, but does not explain
the distribution in the field, or say anytliing of the condition of the troops.
Intelligence from Tuldscha, of the last week in February, relates that the
Turkish Commander-in-Chief was prepared to place 20,000 men at that point
in 24 hours, on the first sign of a forward Russian movement.
Subsequently the following details of the Turkish Army appeared,
furnished to the “Journal de St. Petersburg” by its Constantinople
correspondent.
On the European side, the force was not in excess of 130,000 men, (not
counting a small corps in garrison in the provinces of Epirus and Thessaly).
This force included 150 battalions of about 600 men, or about 90,000 regular
troops, and they are described as admirably armed, equipped, and disciplined,
and animated by a true military spirit. (In other words, except as regards
numbers the description is the reverse of what has come to hand from reliable
sources). The account proceeds with some details of the distribution of this
force.
The army of the Danube, under the command of Eyub Pacha, is in
echelon to the north of the Balkan chain from the Black Sea to the line of the
river Timok. It includes the garrisons of Saitschar and Schumla, and absorbs
of the above force some 70,000 men, whose formation is complete. There
are at Constantinople about 45 battalions, not yet fit to enter the first line, and
behind all these the reserve, being assembled and drilled in various unspecified
localities in the interior. *
* Circassians.