‘The Russo-Turkish War. 1877. Operations in Europe.’ [‎8v] (16/66)

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March 1877. desirous of getting a plausible pretext —“ a golden bridge”—to enable him to
withdraw from a difficult and untenable position.
Warlike preparations, however, were not interrupted. Lists were
prepared at Kischinev of the numbers of troops, quantity of munitions of war,
provisions, guns, stores, &c., for which transport to Jassy would be required,
and forwarded to the Roumanian railway board.
II.
MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
Jan. 1877. I n addition to the Russian armies of occupation and observation on the
Turkish European frontier, described under the heading “ Russian Army
Details,” the following troops had been mobilized in January, but were not
then as yet formed into corps, nor had they received a united tactical
formation:—
Feb. 1877.
1st Infantry Division. —Major-General Prochoroff; Chief of the Staff,
Colonel Leslyr ; Head-Quarters, Lutsk.
1st Brigade of Field Batteries.—Major-General Simanoff, at Ostrog.
17^ Infantry Division. —Major-General Hann ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel
Dennett; Head-Quarters, Kamenetz-Podolsk.
17th Brigade of Field Batteries.—Major-General Friede, at Litina.
18th Infantry Division. —Major-General Nabut; Chief of the Staff, Colonel
Micheef; Head-Quarters, Tcherkask.
18th Brigade of Field Batteries.—Major-General Bogdanoff, at Jitomir.
35th Infantry Division. —Major-General Rail; Chief of the Staff, Colonel
Agon Dovanofsky; Head-Quarters, Zastava; and
3oth Brigade of Field Batteries.—Colonel Feodorenko.
It would appear that there was much confusion in carrying out the actual
mobilization of a portion of the Russian Army at the close of 1876; that
there was an insufficiency of stores and of transport, and that the actual
strength of the troops was much under the estimated numbers.
Great efforts were being made to remedy defects, and, before the end of
the month, these were producing a visible result; but, by the most authentic
January intelligence, dated about the 15th, there were only 118,000 men on the
Turkish frontier, instead of 175,000, the official number. This force was then
supplied with only two weeks’ provisions in the event of its taking the field
against Turkey, and its means of transport were limited. According to a scale
laid down by the Russian War Minister, the capital city was to provide horses,
in the event of a declaration of war, to the Guard and troops of the St.
Petersburg Circle, as follows:—
Saddle horses, 637; Artillery, 2,492; for the No. 1 Train, 1,522; and
for the No. 2 Train, 349; total, 5,000.
It was reported, about the middle of February, that three more Army-
Corps were about to be mobilized.
Further details oi the original mobilization transpired gradually during
this month. According to these, the confusion said to have prevailed was much
exaggerated, and was due to the novelty of the experiment, and the inex
perience of the railway officials, and would be unlikely to occur again ; and, as
regards rumours that had been in circulation of defective stores, useless
ammunition, empty cartridges, &c., the only thing substantiated was, that
while there was probably some foundation for such reports, the time that had
since elapsed had been well utilised in making g'ood deficiencies.
In Bessarabia, the soldier s rations were three-quarters of a pound of
meat, three pounds of bread, sugar, tea, and vegetables. Many of the soldiers
came fiom Bessaiabia, and were at home there, living in comfort, and the
health of the troops was good. As a rule, they were distributed through the
villages, from one to five in a house, and well sheltered.