Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎149v] (298/320)

Sub-Enclosure to Serial No. 18.
Keport from Press Attache, to British Legation, Tehran;, No. 218]8|40, datejo
18th May 1940.
I have the honour to transmit to you the following report.
2. With reference to my despatch of 8th April 1940, paragraphs 7 and 8, it
is evident that discontent at the present regime is becoming more and more
marked. This is of interest in so far as it is accompanied by strong anti-British
feeling. The reason for this is that the Shah is generally regarded as having
won his position by means of British support. 1
3. Among many of the intellectuals there is a growing tendency to turn to
communism as offering the only means /which may improve their lot. There is
no evidence of any widespread communist organisation, but there is a clear
tendency for political thought among the intellectuals to accept connnunist theory.
It is not only the corruption and economic oppression which this class resents,
but also the complete suppression of any political freedom. That this should
lead them to communism is, if hardly logical, at least natural in the circum
stances.
4. As for the masses of the people, in spite of their natural antipathy to*
communism (see my letter to Professor Rushbrook-Williams of December 21st,
1939, (308j4|39), they could probably, in view of the increasing oppression and
poverty, be won over to support some sort of communist movement, provided
their circumstances were favourable to such a movement.
5. There are unconfirmed reports of communist propaganda which is being
carried on with the connivance of sections of the police. There are some 60,000
Russian refugees who have entered the country relatively recently, and are now
dispersed in the neighbourhood of Tehran and the provinces, and some 5,000
Persians who have recently been repatriated from Russia. These also are, at
present, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Tehran. Many of these Russian refugees
(who have become Persian subjects) and repatriated Persians are said to be
communist agents, and to be in possession of funds for propaganda.
6. In connection with communist propaganda, it is worth mentioning that
the Armenian Ramkavar party are said to be spreading Russian, and German
propaganda, particularly in Tabriz and Isfahan. Their activity has increased
since the signing of the Russo-Iranian Trade Agreement. Since that time also
the police have kept a doser watch on the activities of the Armenian Dashnak
party, one of whose objects in Iran was to combat communism (see my despatch
of January 23rd, No. 218j2|40, paragraph 7). This may be merely a coincidence,
but, coupled with other events, it seems not unlikely that there is collaboration
between various members of the police and German and Russian agents.
7. On the other hand there are a large number of people who own property
of some kind or other, even if the value of this is, in most cases, small. This
body of opinion is strongly opposed to any form of communism. Although
often discontented with the present regime, their fear that whatever has been
left to them by the Shah would be seized by a communstically inclined govern
ment such as might gain power with the support of the intellectuals, leads them
to oppose any change likely to develop along such lines. At present, they
represent a sufficiently strong interest to effect any likelihood of subversive
activity by the intellectuals. Such activity is only likely to become dangerous
to the regime if the stability of the latter is first threatened from some other
quarter.
8. The sympathy for communism among the intellectuals is accompanied
by pro-German feeling, which extends to nearly all sections of the communitv.
It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that 70 per cent, of the middle
and upper classes in Northern Iran are p.ro-Grerman. The reasons for this
ha\ e been discussed in my letters to Professor Rushbrook-Williams, dated 14tb
November 1939, No. 444125j39, and 9th March 1940, No. 218|4|40, paragraph 4.
9 The large number of Germans in the country—put at various figures,
of which 1,,00 2 000 is probably the most accurate—is the cause for some
anxiety. Many of them have arrived since the outbreak of war and are cer-
tamly not bona-fide merchants. In the event of the stability of the regime being
tnreatened, it is pot beyond the bonds of possibility that they would attempt, or