Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎64v] (128/320)

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7. It thus appears that the really important unit of provincial govern
ment is to be made smaller and more uniform. This should be a useful re
form, for hitherto there have been great disparities between units directly
dependent from the Ministry of Interior, as for instance between the huge
province of Khorassan and the small district of Qum. The change should
also eliminate the chance of confusion such as recently arose over the status
of the Governor of the district of Khorramshahr-with-Abadan, who main
tained that he was no longer subordinate to the Governor-General of Khuzis-
tan, while the latter insisted that he was subordinate, and the central govern
ment would give no clear decision one way or the other, but could only say
that the Governor of Khorramshahr-with-Abadan could in some cases refer
direct to Tehran.
8. Thus far considered, therefore, the reforms contain no important
novelty except the administrative councils of the Shahristrn and the Bakhsh,
but move in the direction of more subdivision, more uniformity, and more
precision. Not the least, however,, of the failings that require attention in
the present state of local government is weakness of local co-operation between
the provincial representatives of the various ministries and departments,
and the powerlessness or unwillingness of the governors to harmonise their
activities. This defect has been brought into relief by the centralisation of the
present regime. Quite trifling matters involving more than one department
are referred by each representative to Tehran, with the result that the work
of all departments is burdened with a congestion that the national capacity
for brisk and resolute action is ill equipped to bear. Whether, on the one
hand, the definition of the Farmandar’s function as “ the supreme authority
over all national departments in the Shahristan ”, and the introduction of ad
ministrative councils, will make headway against ingrained bureaucratic
indolence and desire to shift responsibility, or, on the other hand, the con
spicuous recent movement towards extreme centralisation will utilise the
reduction of the standard provincial unit to impress itself still further, ex
perience alone will show. The Farmandar’s duties are hedged about with
such phrases as “ within the limits defined by law ”, and much will depend
on the interpretation of these. However this may be, it is nevertheless some
thing gained that a system has been formulated that is capable of germinat
ing this much needed reform,
9. The principal innovation of the scheme is the ‘ Ustan ’ and its official,
the ‘ Ustandar ’. The word, which is not in the current language, has been
advertised as a revival from Sassanian times, whose idiom, as evidenced by
such names as Shapour, evidently appeals to the present Shah, no doubt
because it is untainted by Arab influence, and perhaps also from a spirit of
historical emulation. But it is probably not unrelated to the familiar ter
mination “ -istan ”. At first sight it might appear that the creation of
Ustandars signified a recognition that the carving up of the old provinces into
more numerous departments, somewhat—for all the Sassanian terminology—
on the French model, and doubtless with the same intention, would create a
degree of centralisation for which the times are not yet ripe in Iran, and that
some devolution of authority was necessary. The six Ustans of the original
law—and notably the Western and Northern, which were omitted from the
list of appointments mentioned above in paragraph 3—were clearly at once
realised to be unwieldy, and the process of subdivision was carried further
in the amendment.
10. But the Ustandar is a nebulous figure. He has no fixed seat of
government (Article III, Note) nor permanent office, a fact which will in
convenience him in handling the numerous reports and instructions he is to
receive and give, and is less likely to make for efficiency, than to encourage
the short-circuiting provided for in Article XIX. His duties seem more like
those of an inspector, a go-between, a consulting rather than a practising
administrator. He has no council of Farmandars wherein he could align
them all to his policy. He does not have the same patronage as the Farman-
dar over appointments of subordinate officials (Articles VIII, IX), a matter
which is usually of considerable importance in the East. It is likely that a
ruler faced with the necessity of surrendering a measure of independence to