Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎60r] (119/320)

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8. As already stated, the plan of the Bahmai to surround the military and
exterminate them having failed they fled to the Kuh-i-Mungasht. Plere the
military were unable to follow them owing to the disorganisation of battle,
the smallness of the available force and extreme difficulties of the terrain.
9. Nevertheless while reinforcements were being brought in, the air arm
was employed. For some days the eight aeroplanes stationed in Ahwaz
went daily to Kuh-i-Mungasht and bombed the tribesmen, causing some casual
ties. No result of military value, except that of pinning down the enemy to
the mountains could however be expected and after a few days aerial bombing
was abandoned. The planes were used in other directions—leaflets of which
I enclose the only original I have been able to procure, were dropped from the
air. As few if any of the tribesmen can read, such propaganda would seem
rather useless, as will be observed the leaflets urge the ordinary tribesmen to
surrender and state that the only quarrel is with Khoda Karam. Aeroplanes
were also used to convey General Muiny each day to the area and back to
Ahwaz. Finally an emergency aerodrome seems to have been prepared near
the scene of operations and two aeroplanes kept there for reconnaissance
flights and for bearing messages to Ahwaz.
10. Up to the present, no attempt has been made to attack the tribes
men on the mountain. Apparently this is a large broken mass of ground, very
difficult to take by assault. On the other hand, the tribesmen can subsist
there on such cattle and sheep as they have, together with vegetable products
for a considerable period. From what I can gather locally the present idea is
not to storm the mountain, but to surround the mountain and rely on the
winter cold and storms to cause the rebels to lose heart and desert their leader.
11. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the Honourable the Politi
cal Resident, Bushire (No. 1385), His Majesty’s Consul, Shiraz (No. 1386),
and His Majesty’s Vice-Consul, Khorramshahr (No. 1387).
P. S. —The estimates of the number of tribesmen engaged in the conflict
vary widely. It seems probable, however, that the correct number is in the
region of tw'o thousand of whom less than one thousand have rifles.
( 2 )
{Received on the 29th January 1938, with Political Secretary's letter No. 2, dated
the 13th January 1938.)
[Enclosure in Weekly letter No. 2, dated the 13th January 1938 from
Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .]
(Enclosure in Foreign Office Covering Note No. E 7653/1717/34, dated 8th
January 1938.)
No. 610 (200/10/37),
Letter from British Embassy, Moscow, to thr Foreign Office, London,
No. P. Z. 166/38, dated the 18th December 1937.
With reference to my despatch No. 118 of the 18th March last, I have the
honour to inform you that the recent visit of Herr Baldur von Shirach to
Tehran has given rise to renewed complaints in the Soviet press that fascist
doctrines are making dangerous headway in Iran. The accompanying article
from the “ Journal de Moscou ” of the 14th December is on similar lines to
others which have appeared during the last few weeks in the Soviet verna
cular press. The writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. , it will be seen, concludes from the manner in which
Herr von Shirach was received that German influence has taken deep root in
Persia. Although the leader of the German Youth movement has no official
position in the German Government, he was accorded by the Iranian autho
rities a ceremonial welcome far exceeding what is customary in visits to one
government by the representatives of another, and was allowed to review the
fascist forces in the Iranian capital as though he were at Nuremberg or Munich.
As for the Iranian officials in charge of the review, their conduct was sadly
reminiscent of the semi-colonial Qajar regime. The “ Journal de Moscou ”
concludes with the hope, not very confidently expressed, that some Iranian
statesmen are to be found who look with disapproval on the efforts of