Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎287r] (573/1031)

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s THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT ^
IRAQ.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Otc 1941
December 5, 1941.
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[E 8023/1/93]
1941
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Section 1.
Copy No. 07
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^ « c* v>-a 11 ^ /r A m a Inin Cornwallis to Mr. Kdrn.—(Rrcoi rod Docombor 5.)
(No. 317.)
Sir,
Bagdad, November 11, 1941.
uQojv .
941.JL^JU(HW
THE formation of a new Cabinet and the opening of a new session of „ 1 1 '|^
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Parliament mark a stage from which it is convenient to look back and survey
the events which have occurred since I wrote mv last narrative rlpsnntrh nn t.lm
11 th Julv (No 1651. •
i d-' The Cabinet of Jamil Madfai had then been in office a little over a month ^
and was making slow but not entirely unsatisfactory efforts to clear up the< 1 -
economic and political confusion caused by Rashid Ali's reckless assault on the
Anglo-Iraqi alliance. " djos^ oA frlo
3. Unfortunately the Prime Minister’s energy soon began to flag, and the he
readiness which he showed to yield to the importunities of those who besought
him to spare even some of the most active of pro-Nazi enthusiasts eventually
brought about his fall.
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4. In July, however, the Government was still fairly active. Propaganda » r
was accumulating rather than losing energy, and though much of it was devoted
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to praise of Jamil Madfai as the true patriot rather than to condemnation of tn J 5
Rashid Ali and the principles for which he stood, there was still promise of 1
further action to eradicate pro-nazism from the public services.
5. On the 13th July three obscure men were publicly hanged for crimes
committed during the rioting of the 1 st and 2 nd June, and about the same time
a number of others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The effect was
salutary, but these punishments cannot be regarded as a just and adequate
liquidation of the deplorable happenings of those two days. Many police and
military officers are known to have taken part in the general looting and killing,
but few of them were punished, and even where disciplinary action was taken
it seldom fitted the crime. The report of the commission set up to enquire into
the events of those two days was in the hands of the Madfai Government some
time before their resignation, but they took no action against the high officials
whose conduct is impugned.
6 . During the latter half of July and the early davs of August further
action was taken against many of the Palestinian and Syrian political fugitives
who had for so long infected political life in Iraq with their extreme nationalism
and bitter hatred of Great Britain. A large number were repatriated and about
thirty were banished to villages in the Kurdish districts, where they are unlikely
to find public sympathy for their troublesome agitation. These prophylactic
measures were rounded off by the successful arrest of three turbulent tribesmen
of the south . Sheikh Abdul Wahid-al-Haj Sikkar, Saiyid Alwan-al-Yasiri and
Saiyid Qati-al-Awadi. All three had been most active supporters of Rashid Ali
and had continued to exercise a baneful influence even after his flight The
removal of these men brought much relief to the Southern Euphrates area, where
endemic disputes among well-armed tribes gave them wide opportunities for
dangerous intrigues.
7. In the army a mild purge was carried out, and about eighty officers of
all ranks were retired on pensions.
8 . By the middle of August, however, the Government’s efforts to mop up
the big pockets of anti-British elements left behind after the rout of Rashid Ali’s
main forces began to slacken. The completion of the internment camp at Fao
hung fire, and action taken by mutasarnfs against pro-Nazi officials was often
reversed by Ministers. The impression thus spread abroad that the Prime
Minister favoured appeasement and agitation against ourselves be<mn to revive
[24—35]
RECd. POL* DEFt