Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎274v] (548/1031)

the remainder from the B.O.D. Company. The articles confiscated at the
consulate were for the most part returned in June (some from Qasim Maqsud’s
own baggage). Some credit for the maintenance of order in the critical days
after Qasim Maqsud’s departure and before the return of the rightful mutessarif,
Tahsin Ali, must be given to the Commandant of Police, Kamil Yahya (who, all
the same, is reputed to have profited by the thefts in May), and to a handful of ^
the better citizens of Mosul, chief of whom were Salim Namiq (Qaimmaqam of
Mosul) and Khair-ud-din A1 Umari (President of the Municipality).
Aftermath.
57. It was not to be expected that the glow of this conflagration would be
soon extinguished. Propaganda had been too long at work, money had been
handed out and the Germans had made use of their time here to plant agents.
Propaganda was actively carried on from Syria both during and after the rebel
lion. On the 19th May the Special Service Officer at Kamishlieh reported to his
superior at Hassetcheh that Sheikh Daham al Hadi, chief of the Syrian
Shammar, was touring his tribe to instruct them to leave for Iraq on the
22nd May. What prevented them is not known, unless it was that they sensed
the coming collapse. On the night of the 31st May Dr. Grobba stopped for two
hours at Tel Kotchek to interview Sheikh Wadban. As late as the 29th June
M. Renouhardt and Major Meyer-Ricks, of the Armistice Commission, inter
viewed Sheikh Daham at Hassetcheh and offered him money and arms to
intimidate Sheikh Sofouq with tales of German successes and of the Germans’
imminent return to Iraq via Russia and Persia, and to harass the British on
the Iraq frontier. A description of this interview and of the French S.S.O.’s
attitude towards it is given as an annex to this report.Q
58. The expulsion of the Italian Legation, British penetration into Syria
and Persia, the shifting of the war from the Near East to Russia, the removal from
Mosul of a number of anti-British individuals, the arrival of increasingly large
British forces, and the healing of time have progressively driven this sullen
hostility underground. With the usual reservations always applicable to such a
backward area, the town and countryside are now normal for anyone to go about,
and you will not see the black looks of last June. As late as August there were
instances of stones being thrown at British military transport by children
undoubtedly encouraged by their parents and elders; that is no longer (November)
the case. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to say that the sentiments of this
mercurial population are fundamentally satisfactory. Nationalism, which has
for long been staple food in the schools, the army and the coffee-shops, does not
need the stimulant of Nazi propaganda to dispose people of limited vision to be
no more than outwardly friendly towards a Power that is in important respects
in occupation. Any important German success in Asia could very quickly alter
things. And there are still Nazi sympathisers here.
59. It was a very long time before anything was done to remove the C.I.D.
police inspector, Amin Zaki. whose occult influence opposed a proper clean-up
of undesirables. He was defended by the mutessarif, Tahsin Ali, and only after
the latter’s departure was transferred to Zibar, where it is hoped that he can
do no harm. The Director of Education, who in no circumstances ought to be
a man of totalitarian leanings, is still Yusif Zainal; and, if Tahsin Ali did not
remove him as mutessarif, it is to be feared that he will not do so as Minister
of Education, unless pressure is applied. The aggressive local secretary of the
Youno- Men’s Moslem Association, Bashir Sakkal, still teaches in the Faisaliah
School, although the association’s premises have been closed. The Faisaliah
School, managed by the Awqaf, is an undesirable institution as at present
constituted.
60. The Iraq army is a difficult problem. The military experience ^ained
by many of the officers in May consisted of swaggering about and having their
own way for a month, moving from barracks into town in case they were bombed
driving about in cars of British subjects and living in the loot of Qaiyarah. The
collapse of what was essentially an army rebellion has left a sense of frustration
which seeks an outlet. The Yezidi situation in September seemed to offer an
opportunity, more especially as that situation is closely bound up with the
(9 Not printed.