Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎271r] (541/1031)

5
17. Having seen off the last aeroplane from K. 3 on the morning of the
2nd May, the B.O.D. desert party prepared to return to Qaiyarah. But, before
they set off, K. 3 station picked up the news that K. 2 had been occupied, and all
communications eastward of K. 3 appeared to be broken. Next they learnt that,
to the westward, H. 3 had been attacked and that Rutbah had been suirounded
and the tanks fired. Later came a signal from Qaiyarah that so far (2 P-M-) r . 1D
“ visitors ” had arrived. They therefore decided to make for Qaiyarah via
Dhuwaisan and Hatra. K. 3 and Haditha village lie on the right bank of the
Euphrates; it was therefore necessary to cross the river by the Blondin ferry to
get to Qaiyarah. Just as the last of the convoy had crossed, a message was
telephoned over from Iv. 3 that Qaiyarah had been occupied, ihe fields managei,
Mr. Heseldin, recrossed to K. 3 to get further and fuller information and to
obtain money; the remainder, under cover of the hills on the left bank, debated
the possibility of making for Syria. At this juncture (5 p.m.) K. 3 was occupied
by police, and Mr. Heseldin and the K. 3 staff were taken prisoners to Haditha.
The party on the opposite bank understood what had gone wrong when they tried
to telephone K. 3 from the ferry. To get to Syria now via the Tripoli pipe-line
or the Anah-Abu Kemal route was now impossible, for both meant recrossing
to the right bank. It was decided that before risking a journey to Syria through
uncertain tribal country on the left bank it would be better to return to the
neighbourhood of Qaiyarah and get under cover of the friendly Shammar with
whom the company had always worked. This course would also enable them to
get into contact with the rest of the company’s staff, if they were still at
Qaiyarah, and, if things went well, to pick up clothing and money.
18. They spent the night in the desert 76 miles from K. 3, and continued at
dawn of the 3rd' May to Hibbarah, some 23 miles west of Qaiyarah. Here they
halted and sent in their Shammar guide to find Sheikh Mishan. The guide
returned in the evening to say that he had been unable to speak to the sheikh and
that Qaiyarah camp had been evacuated. So they camped for the night at
Hibbarah. .
19. On the morning of the 4th May the Shammar sent them an invitation
to come to their tents at Jawan, which they accepted. When they reached Jawan
news of events in Qaiyarah and Mosul imparted by the Shammar determined them
to make for Syria; but as soon as this intention transpired the Shammar created
difficulties, and it is possible that the tribesmen did not intend to let them out of
their hands. In the afternoon, just as the party, having spent most of the day
in negotiations and messages to and from Sheikh Mishan, weie prepai ing to
accept the inevitable and go to Qaiyarah under Shammar protection, two cai-loads
of police arrived, headed by the Mudir of the Shorah (Hammam Alii) Nahiyah,
the party were arrested at revolver-point, and the Shammar weie dii\en off by the
police. For a moment it looked as if the police and tribesmen were going to have
20. The party were taken to Mosul in the charge of the Mudir Nahiyah.
On arrival in the evening they were driven round the main streets of the town
and halted opposite the principal coffee-houses tor display to the assembled
populace At 3 o’clock that afternoon (the 4th May) the first British air raid
had taken place over Mosul, and it is thought that this was staged to produce a
counterblast. Some of the populace were persuaded that these were British
prisoners of war. There was a great deal of hand-clapping, some shouting and
some spitting, but no dangerous demonstration. 1 he C.I.D. police officer, Amm
Zaki, rode in the front car, insisted on the inside light being turned on to display
the occupants, and made hand-clapping motions to show the crowd what they \yei e
expected to do. At about 7 p.m. the party were brought to the British Consulate.
21 . The adventures of the desert convoy have been tieated somewhat
lengthily because (a) they show the stages by which direct action by the
authorities spread over the outlying parts of North-West Iraq and down the
pipe-lines on the 2 nd May and the following days, and how the Mosul e\acuation
convoy that was to have left the consulate on the 2 nd May would probably have
fared had it ever left; (b) they are those of an unarmed party at large in tribal
territory during the first three days of hostilities; (c) they indicate the parts
played by the Shammar, the Mudir Nahiyah of Shorah (lewfiq Shabib, brother
of Colonel Kamil Shabib of the “Golden Square”), and Police Officer Amm
Zaki. Another of Tewfiq Shabib’s exploits is recounted in paragraph 54. He
has since been suspended from duty for five years. Amin Zaki has been
stellenbosched to Zibar.