Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎269v] (538/1031)

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Telegrams were subject to inordinate delay and mutilation. Therefore, I
interviewed Qasim Maqsud, and gave him the second part of the ambassador’s
message. He replied that he was under the orders of Bagdad, and could “ make
no answer. I said that I did not require an answer; I was merely telling him
something I considered it important for him to know. Qasim Maqsud was not
a^ man of sufficient character to take the independent line T had hoped for, bu^)
throughout April and May he was, by all evidence, a very unhappy man, inwardly
convinced that Rashid Ali had aroused an opponent whom he could not
withstand. Differences of opinion among his own officers, latent opposition
among the notables of Mosul, and lack of sympathy among the tribes of the north
were primarily responsible for Qasim Maqsud’s conviction.
3. During the remainder of the month instructions were received con-
cerning the possible rapid evacuation of British women and children and
concentration and/or evacuation of the males. Until the occupation of Syria and
Persia by friendly forces Mosul was awkwardly placed for evacuation, except to
Bagdad. It is hemmed round with frontiers. The Turkish frontier is an
inhospitable one in this region, and the road to it presents difficulties. The road
to the Persian frontier lies through mountainous country unsuitable for women
and children in time of disorder. Syria meant internment for British males of
military age, but internment might be preferable to danger to life and limb in
Iraq. Ihe most satisfactory route seemed via Baiji and the pipe-line to Trans
jordan. For evacuation of women and children, it was decided to use the
railway via Syria and Turkey to Palestine; for any general evacuation, the
pipe-lme to Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . It was fortunate that in the event the latter route was
not used, except for the evacuation by air of the B.O.D. Company’s women and
children, for attacks on the pumping stations broke out at the very outset of
hostilities.
4. Experience proved that voluntary evacuation and local secrecy, to avoid
causing alarm, are objects that cannot together be attained. The poorer British
subjects will not move without good reason given, and the better-to-do in Mosul,
whose morale was excellent, did not see any reason to stir, in the sultry calm that
prevailed in April, until I had strained to the breaking-point my instructions on
the subject of secrecy.
Evacuation.
5. Between 11 a.m. and noon on Tuesday, the 29th April, His Majesty’s
Ambassador’s telegram was received, containing instructions that British women
and children should leave Iraq, but not via Bagdad, and that assistance in this
sense should be given to an American family in Mosul. The north-bound Taurus
ex pi ess left Mosul that day at 2 ‘SO p.m. Most of the English women and
children were got on board, thanks to the helpful attitude of the French and
Turkish Consuls; certain of them, owing to delay caused by the Iraqi passport
authorities, had to chase the train in cars as far as Tel Hugenah. This left four
British families and one American, who for various reasons—mainly passport
complications—could not, or would not, go by that day’s train. The'wives and
children of the scattered British Indians and British subjects of local denizen-
ship were mostly of local origin, and were not of a kind to be launched without
their menfolk on a journey through foreign territory. Although a number of the
men were later rounded up and interned in the consulate, these local families
remained unharmed in the town through the subsequent troubles.
6. It was not until between 1 and 2 p.m. on the 29th April that His
Majesty’s Ambassador’s decision could be telephoned to the B.O.D. Company at
Qaiyarah. The authorities had practically monopolised the telephones and all
calls were made with great difficulty. The B.O.D. Company had independent
arrangements for evacuating their women and children.
7 At about 7 p.m. on Wednesday, the 30th April, another telegram from
His Majesty s Ambassador arrived, announcing that males in Bagdad were beine
concentrated. Although Mosul town was quiet, and the only unwholesome signs
were police control of movement on the roads and great difficulty in communica
tions (it proved impossible to get through to Qaiyarah or Ain Zalah that evening)
it was decided to collect everyone in the consulate and the British houses in its
immediate vicinity, to ask the authorities for a police cordon round the area
and to broach with them the question of providing a safe-conduct to the frontier,
if and when this should be asked for. All available British and Americans were
accordingly brought into the concentration area, and at 9 p.m. I interviewed