Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎85r] (169/1031)

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(E 2753/2655/93).
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A
ers working
British civil officials and'’- mi-1 i*tar'y 'oJ
in Iraq in close association with the officials and people of the
'^country are often distressed hy the administrative inefficiency
'T/hich they see around them on all sides* They hear many complaints
of injustices suffered and are frequently asked why the British
Government does not interfere more actively to right the people 1 s
wrongs, organise "better public services and stop the more "blatant
malpractices which frequently discredit public life. This sort
of talk, with its underlying implication that through their sins
of omission the British are to blame for the woes of the Iraqi
people, tends to throw the British officer or official on the
defensive and even to induce in him a quite unnecessary feeling of
guilt for his country’s alleged shortcomings.
2. It is a mistake to be bamboozled in this way by such
specious talk about our so-called responsibilities to the people,
their looking to us to maintain the principles of equity and
justice and losing faith in us if we fail. The Iraqis wanted
their independence; they still want it, and they would quite rightly
fight if we tried to take it away. But unless we take over the
administration, we cannot hope to ensure justice and we cannot
assume real control without depriving Iraq of its independence.
3. The hard fact is that a people get the government they
deserve and, conversely, a government usually gets the electorate
it deserves. The Iraqis often enough moan about the injustice and
put the blame on us, but they seldom voice their views in public or
stir a finger themselves to put things right. Until they do so
they will neither enjoy or deserve a better government and it is
well to rub this in.
4. As for ourselves, our chief task during the war is to
see that friendly relations are maintained with the Iraqi
Government and the people and to do all we can to ensure that the
country makes a respectable contribution to the war effort of the
United Nations. In doing this, we must also think of the future
and endeavour to lay a foundation of friendship which will ensure
the continuance of our influence in peacetime. It may be said
that the more justice we can introduce the easier will be our task.
This is true up to a point but not to the point where our
interference prejudices our relations with the Iraqi Government and
thereby our essential aims.
5. Experience has shown that it is useless for us to force
British officials on the Iraqi Government. We can and should
suggest, but if we impose, the officials are frozen out and become
objects of resentment. The Iraqis must themselves work out their
own salvation. We can offer help but the days when we could
force the acceptance of assistance in internal administration are
gone.
6. My object in writing this minute is to try and put the
position in its proper perspective. I do not mean to infer
that/