Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎38r] (75/1031)

5
pay so very much higher than their own Ministers, and are quick to spot a second-
rater. I have long held that the provision of the mo»t suitable men will be best
assured by the creation of a Middle East personnel pool, embracing the Foreign
| Office, Colonial Office and India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , from which trained and competent men
could be seconded. I trust that some such plan may soon materialise.
(c) It is most important that we should maintain the personal contacts
which we have created. We should therefore keep on the organisations of
Political Advisorate and Public Relations for as long as possible. When the time
comes to give them up, we must hope that there will be some administrative
inspectors or land settlement officers in the districts. Failing this, we should
consider the establishment of more consulates whose duties would be mainly
politico-social. The British Institutes must be encouraged and the more British
officials we can get into the Education Department, both in the towns and in
the districts, the better. The Oriental Secretariat of this embassy will become
more important as the other organisations change or disappear, and it must
place high value on personal contacts.
13. A relationship between Iraq and Britain has developed which places
us in a strong and enviable position. It will, I consider, be our own fault if
we allow that position to deteriorate. We must be continually on our guard and
on the alert, for naturally we have many enemies and critics, not all of them
Iraqi. Finally, we must take into account in all our actions the new feeling of /
solidarity and unity which animates the whole Arab world. The Arabs them- /
selves have publicly acknowledged that it is we who have sponsored it and that
it is we who have made its realisation possible. It is all the more important,
therefore, to consider the Arab world as one, and not as various units on the
map, to be handled individually or in sections by different Government depart
ments. Our policy towards the Middle Fast as a whole, it seems to me, requires |
greater co-ordinatiom It may, for example, seem a small thing in London to (
present the King of Egypt with an aircraft and to make the Regent of Iraq pay
for his. But such an incident can have serious consequences as implying
favouritism. And, as Lord Killearn has stated, we must be on our guard against
the painful gibe that the only way to get anything out of the British is to kick
them.
14. Any action which we take in regard to Syria or Palestine, for instance,
will, as I have often emphasised, have a direct and immediate bearing on our
position, influence and prospects in Iraq; and it is to the maintenance of British
interests and British influence that our efforts should be primarily and consistently
devoted. It is creditable to any man that he should feel moved to pity and sym
pathy by the sufferings of the Jews, or the Assyrians, or the Kurds or the Arabs;
but you cannot govern by sentiment. Political lines of force do not change, and
the laws of geography and history cannot be revoked. Our interests in this part
of the world have been identical for' more than 200 years. Originally those
interests were selfish. They are no longer so, for, whether we will it or not, the
lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Middle East are as directly bound
up with the maintenance of our position as were those of their ancestors with
the existence of the Roman Empire. Were we to be driven from our paramount (
position here, the Middl^ East would dissolve in a chaos such as that which
enveloped it when the Roman Empire decayed. In time, it may well be, other
nations will be willing to share our responsibilities, as they are already eager
to share our privileges. But that day has yet to come. Until it dawns, it is for
us to maintain our own, and by so doing to preserve and enhance the tranquillitv
and prosperity of this ancient and historic land.
15. I cannot close this last despatch without recording how much I owe to
my own staff. I have endeavoured to show that such success as has been achieved
during the last four years has been due to the united efforts of a good many depart
ments and people working in harmony to a definite end. In this concerted plan,
the embassy staff had ti vital and essential part to play, and I cannot speak too
highly of the manner in which, one and all, they have acquitted themselves. I
owe them a deep debt of gratitude.
16. I am sending a copv of this despatch to the Minister Resident Middle
East.
I have, &c.
KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.