'REPORT on the Working of the Line of Communication AND ON THE Withdrawal of the British Military Mission IN EAST PERSIA, 1919-20. GENERAL STAFF INDIA. [‎63r] (136/168)

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In reserve at Birjand to meet emergencies, 9 Hup Ambulances.
.. ^fecbanical Transport vehicles will not be used on Meshed-Turbat Sec
tion to pick up sick from the Meshed columns. In lieu of Mechanical Trans-
port vehicles Meshed columns A, B and C will be accompanied by 8 Fourgons
and Column D by 12 Fourgons as far as Turbat whence evacuation will
oe carried out by Mechanical Transport.
3. The Mechanical Iransport vehicles allotted to sections will be worked
on the line indicated in Medical Instructions in paragraph 3, i.e.) when not
running to meet columns they will be used to evacuate sick from
the post abo\e and Senior Medical Officer of each post will keep the Senior
Medical Officer of the post next below informed daily of the number of
sick requiring evacuation so that more vehicles than are actually required
need not be sent.
4. The attached Graph is intended to indicate the working of the Mecha
nical Transport convoys, showing the days on which they will be employed on
evacuating Irom the post above and those on which they will be employed
in picking up sick from columns marching down.
IV. —Ordnance.
The preparations for the withdrawal involved a very considerable amount
of extra work on the part of all concerned, as not only was it necessary to
make repeated issues to equip units for the march, but while this work was
in progress the remaining stores in the Hep6ts had to be packed and got
ready either for sale to the Persian Army (which sale never materialized), or
return to India, or in certain instances for sale locally, and all this work was
in addition to ordinary duties in connection with check and despatch of stores
from post to post, up or down the line, as the case may be. The mere
packing and marking of stores intended for sale to the Persian Army was in
itself a big undertaking, and involved a considerable amount of extra
clerical work just at time when the personnel at the various Depots were
working at great pressure.
The delay on the part of certain units (although due notice had been
given to all concerned) to submit their demands until after the withdrawal
had actually commenced, caused a lot of extra and unnecessary work, as stores
already packed and even in transit down the line to Duzdap had to be
re-opened to make numerous petty issues, and in some instances further
demands had to be submitted on Quetta Arsenal for the items which had only
recently been returned to them. A routine order was published on the 31st
July 1920 closing all Dep6ts for further issues, but it was found necessary
to re-open everyone of them to meet urgent demands from every direction.
2. The ultimate disposal of Ordnance Stores, including those earmarked
for the Persian Army, was as follows :—
Stores at Meshed were sold, except certain articles of equipment^ which
would be of use to an enemy ; these were back-loaded to railhead ;
this action was taken in accordance with instructions from the
Chief of the General Staff forwarded with Genstaff Division,
Quetta, wire No.L.-128 of 30th July. The Consul-General and
Malmiss were also consulted as to what stores should be
sold.
With regard to the stores south of Meshed, I realized that at the last
moment there w r ere likely to be few bids for stores which traders
would well know must either be destroyed or abandoned ; such
stores for which transport was available were back-loaded to
railhead by connecting convoys. The balance was sold.
Accounts of all sales have been sent to Audit, Quetta, by the Deputy
Assistant Director of Supply and Transport, Purchases (Meshed),
Major Byrch, who superintended the auctions.
3. Under instructions from India all surplus rifles and ammunition were
back-loaded to railhead \ no sooner had they arrived when orders were received
to send them all back to Meshed for the use of the Persian Army. I uas