Coll 6/66 'Saudi-Arabia: Saudi-Transjordan Frontier' [‎83r] (165/427)

he had ever heard of any Saudi claim to the Jebel Rashrashiya, which had never
been mentioned in connexion with the Saudi Government’s claim to Hazim, and
of which he had found no trace in the records of Sir G. Clayton’s negotiations
which resulted in the Hadda Agreement. These records were, however, very
full on the question of the allocation of Qaf, which had for a long time formed
the main point in dispute, and when it was eventually agreed that Qaf should go
to King Abdul Aziz, the area which went with it had been clearly specified as
consisting of its date gardens and salt pans. There had been no suggestion that
any larger area should be conceded. If, however, Fuad Bey could produce any
evidence to show that it had been the clear intention of the negotiators that the
Jebel Rashrashiya should go to Saudi Arabia, any such evidence would, of course,
be relevant and would have to be very carefully considered.
FUAD BEY HAMZA said that his statement was supported by the
testimony of others who had taken part in the negotiations on the Saudi side.
Mr. RENDER said that, apart from the merits of the question, this
suggestion provided a good example of the difficulties which had arisen, since, if
King Abdul Aziz thought he had secured Hazim and the Jebel Rashrashiya
(although the line as drawn on the 1918 map patently left Hazim in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan ),
Sir G. Clayton equally thought that he, for his part, had secured the whole of
the Jebel Tubeik massif and the route surrounding it for Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
Mr. Rendel added that the map of the northern end of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan -Nejd
frontier appeared to be much more accurate than at the southern end, since the
country in question was much better known and far more frequented.
FUAD BEY HAMZA at this point interjected that King Abdul Aziz in
any event claimed the Jebel Tubeik under his dormant claim to Aqaba and the
Sanjak of Maan.
Mr. RENDEL reminded Fuad Bey that it had been agreed last September
that this question should not be raised for the present. He did not, therefore,
wish to raise it. But unless Sir G. Clayton had wished to secure the Jebel
Tubeik massif for Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , the southern end of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan -Nejd
frontier—carried as it was so far to the east and south—would have been
meaningless. The Jebel Tubeik fell within Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan because the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan -
Nejd frontier extended to the east and south of it, and not as forming part of
the Aqaba-Maan territory. The Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan -Nejd frontier was a valid inter
nationally agreed boundary and could hardly be disputed.
FUAD BEY HAMZA then asked for a full statement of His Majesty’s
Government's view of the problem, and he suggested that, if Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan needed
any particular concession of territory for practical purposes, the Saudi Govern
ment would no doubt be willing to consider granting it, subject, of course, to their
obtaining corresponding concessions of equal value in return.
Mr. RENDEL said that, if Fuad Bey wished, he would let him have a written
statement of His Majesty’s Government’s proposals such as, he hoped, would be
of assistance to Fuad Bey in laying these proposals before King Abdul Aziz. He
considered, however, that questions of give-and-take did not arise at this stage
and might never do so, since what His Majesty’s Government were trying to
establish was merely the true line of the Hadda Agreement frontier. Mr. Rendel
trusted therefore that the Saudi Government would be willing to co-operate with
His Majesty’s Government in making the necessary survey, in deciding what were
the intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton, and ultimately in appoint
ing a frontier delimitation commission. All this, however, would necessarily take
a long time, and he asked Fuad Bey whether he did not think that, in all the
circumstances, and in view of the number of other difficult questions outstanding,
it might not be better to carry on for the present with the existing line. The
present tacitly accepted boundary, which had long been observed in practice, had
not, in fact, led to many difficulties. There had certainlv been frontier difficulties
but these were of a different order and were due to raiding or to irregular
behaviour on the part of frontier officials. He would, for instance, like to take the
0 PP 0 i'tunity to draw Fuad Bey’s serious attention to the unsatisfactory reports
which had been received by His Majesty’s Government as to the attitude of the
Saudi Amir of Qaf. He did not wish to pursue the matter in detail at that