Coll 6/66 'Saudi-Arabia: Saudi-Transjordan Frontier' [‎5r] (9/427)

38° east with parallel 29° 35' north to a point on the Hejaz Railway 2 miles
south of Mudawara, and thence to a point on the Gulf of Akaba 2 miles south
of Akaba town, as an attack upon territory for which they were responsible.
13. In May 1925 it was reported that Ibn Saud was contemplating the
despatch of a force against Akaba, and a further message was sent to him, in
which it was declared that His Majesty’s Government could not allow Akhwan
^forces to violate this line, that if such forces attempted to enter Akaba His
Majesty’s Government would take the necessary steps to eject them, and that
His Majesty’s Government were taking steps to establish the authority of the
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan administration in the whole area comprised within the boundary
communicated to Ibn Saud in October 1924. Ibn Saud replied that he had noted
the contents of this communication, and called oh his troops.
14. In October 1925, on the occasion of the negotiations for the settlement
of the frontier between Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Nejd which culminated in the Hadda
Agreement of the 2nd November, 1925 (Cmd. 2566), Ibn Saud was informed of
His Majesty’s Government’s decision that the frontier line between Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
and the Hejaz should eventually be drawn in accordance with the declarations
referred to in the two preceding paragraphs.
15. When, after the final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud, it was decided
to enter into negotiations with him for a new treaty, it was proposed that a
protocol should be attached to the treaty, embodying Ibn Saud’s agreement to the
Hejaz- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan boundary claimed by His Majesty’s Government. Ibn Saud
at first presented a counter-request for the return to the Hejaz of the Maan-
Akaba district. When it was made clear to him that His Majesty’s Government
had no intention of receding from their attitude in the matter, he withdrew
his request, and suggested that the whole matter should be dropped from the
negotiations, saying that acceptance of the proposed frontier would expose him
to severe criticism in the Moslem world for having ceded a portion of the Holy
Land of Islam to Great Britain, and that the question should be left over until
a more favourable moment. At the same time, he stated his readiness to pledge
himself secretly not in practice to raise the subject or question the occupation
and administration of the district by the officers of His Majesty’s Government.
Moreover, after further pressure, Ibn Saud eventually proposed, albeit
reluctantly, that he should give a guarantee in writing to respect the status quo
for the time being. After much discussion, it was agreed that this guarantee
should be included in an exchange of notes to be attached to the Treaty of Jedda
(Cmd. 2951), which was eventually signed on the 20th May, 1927.
16. In these notes,(') which were dated the I9th May and 21st May,
Sir Gilbert Clayton, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, defined the frontier
on the lines already indicated in the present memorandum, and Ibn Saud, after
stating that he found it impossible in the present circumstances to effect a final
settlement of this question, went on to say that nevertheless, out of friendship
for His Majesty’s Government, he desired to express his willingness to maintain
the status quo in the Maan-Akaba district and not to interfere in its adminis
tration until favourable circumstances would permit a final settlement of the
question.
17. But in addition to the published notes, there is also a secret, unpublished
note,( 3 ) dated the 21st May, 1927, in which Ibn Saud stated that his request for
the postponement of any settlement of this question had not been dictated by any
desire on his part to dispute the ownership of the territory in question, but only
his fear lest, owing to the activities of his enemies, his acceptance of the frontier
proposed by His Majesty’s Government might be seized upon as a weapon for
hostile criticism against him; and that, when it became necessary to effect the
final settlement of the question His Majesty’s Government would find him willing
to abide by whatever decision they might think just,
18. The question remains up to the present time as defined in these notes,
and confirmed, so far as the official notes were concerned, in an exchange of
notes( 4 ) (Cmd. 5380) of the 3rd October. 1936, modifying the Treaty of Jedda.
But when the report of the Royal Commission on Palestine was published in
July 1937, Ibn Saud made it clear that if as a result of this report Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
eventually became independent of British control, he would expect Akaba and
Maan to be made over to him. The possibility was accordingly explored of offering
C)
See Annex C.
B 2
( 2 ) See Annex A.
[805 m—1]
(•q See Annex B.