'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎138v] (283/294)

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16. Night attacks usually take the fora of an ambush of an anti
sabotage patrol and should be dealt with as described in paras. 13 and 14
17. They may also occur against infantry in M.T. moving from camp or
billets to carry out a night operation or returning therefrom. In such
cases A.F.V’s. should escort whenever possible, their action being to
engage enemy ambushers by fire while the infantry M.T. column continues
its movement. But such movements should be restricted to a minimum.
Lorries thus emplo 3 ’ r ed are never to move singly. Ambush patrols should
not be embussed and moved back to their stations during darkness.
18. ^ Where A.F.V's. are not available the normal protection precautions
laid down in “Notes on Imperial Policing”, Chapter IV, Sec.II, para. 7
(page 25), must always be adopted.
19. Such action it may be argued, merely tends to slow down the move
ments of^the infantry and prevent them reaching their destination in
time. In this type of guerilla warfare, however, where the greatest
difficulty of all is to find the enemy and bring him to action, every
opportunity must be sought of closing with him.
20. Day attacks are usually made on buses, and cars travelling alone
or in convoy, or on telegraph line repair gangs. In other words the
bus or convoy provides a “bait” for the armed bands. Almost every
occasion on which armed bands have been successfully dealt with has been
the result of attacks as described above.
21. The io-ea-l to aim at is the immediate "fixing” of the armed band
either by M.G-., mortar or air action - or by the two former alone if air
craft are not immediately present until they arrive - followed by an
infantry striking^ force which must immediately surround the enemy if it
is to achieve decisive success.
22.^ The gradual obliteration of bands will go a long way towards res-
onng law and order, but it must be remembered that whilst air action
alone will-probably cause considerable enemy casualties, only ground
action acting in co-operation with the air can kill or capture rebels and
secure their arms and ammunition. This latter is most important and
infantry must myariabiy endeavour to get to the scene of an air action
if the aircraft indicates it has pinned the enemy, or casualties with
23. The introduction of a picquetting system over the most dangerous
portions of the main roads will undoubtedly restrict the enemy's attacks
on^convoys, ouses and cars, but at the same time the picquets themselves
may o fer a bait . The dual problem of securing the main roads from
° f inducin £ the enem y to come into the open in daylight is a
^ 1GU u 0 ^ le » in e answer may be to allow unrestricted movement of M.T.
along che picquetted portions of the main roads, but at the present
moment the A.O.C. does not consider it safe to allow the daily and other
convoys - e.g. rations - to move unprotected.
GROUND STRIKING FORCES
ha f proved that the ground striking forces situated in
UU-bAPavi uABLJS and JENIN have proved sufficient for the main roads in
tne Northern Brigade Area.
In tne Southern Brigade the only portions of main roads over which
groun striking forces have had to act to deal with the armed bands attack
ing motor traffic, are as follows:-
JERUSALEM - BAB EL NAD.
JERUSALEM - KHAN LUBBAN.
JERUSALEM - JERICHO.