'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎130v] (267/294)

44816-1
194
Am half mile west of KAPR SUE. Have encountered an armed band
about 20 strong. One tank got track off. Ifajr need assistance
withdrawing. Jmi “'being sniped on now. ,r
Between 1535 hours and 1650 hours I sent messages as under:-
"From CATO
- Lieut. Mills is coming out now.
To
CATO
- No. He need not start yet. I may be able to
withdraw without help.
From CATO
- Any chance of cutting them off?
To
CATO
- No chance of getting behind band,
return only Tank has tracks off.
Question <
From CATO
- How about attacking from the air?
To
CATO
- Yes. Air v/ould probably get good
shooting.
From
CATO
- 0. K.
To
CATO
- Keep open - off."
in
During this time the drivers had succeeded in getting the track of
T.1163 under the 'bogie wheels in spite of continuous and fairly accurate
oniping. a <_ about 1630 hours, as the fire v/as becoming increasingly
heavy and accurate, I ordered the drivers to get into their tanks and
close down completely. The drivers were fearless in their efforts to
repair the tank and deserve great credit.
Although the firing was heavy we could not see many of the enemy,
as they were still about 600 to 800 yards away on most sides, and the
sun was beginning to set. At 1700 hours, the enemy started to attack
from all sides and then I realised that my original estimate of their
strength as ^ was incorrect, as X saw about four parties of about 15 to
20 strong, moving along the crests of the hills on all sides. I then
sent ohe S.0.6. signal out, I had no time for further wirelessing,
there must nave been at least 50 of them. They started running in
towards us from the surrounding hills, shouting and screaming. They
Uoed the cover of the rocks well. They advanced in very open order so
that there v/as seldom a target of more than one man, although Cpl. Lev/is
get one goou burst amongst a party of 8 at about 600 yards. During their
approach we managed to hit a few in the failing light.
At 1720 hours the situation was critical. My gun had jammed -
Cpl. Lewis's gun would fire only single shots - Cpl. Prosser's gun alone
v/as firing properly. The enemy v/ere about 300 yards av/ay and closing in
quickly. Their benaviour v/as fanatical and only a direct hit could stop
them. At this moment an aeroplane appeared. I fired several Verey
Lights and the pilot spotted us. He dropped a message on us and
fortunately made an excellent shot, which landed only 5 yards av/ay.
ihe message said, "Am reporting your ix^ALtion". i n ^ opinion this
aeroplane made a tremendous difference to the situation, for two reasons.
First, it caused the Arabs to hesitate in their advance for a few
minuoes, and mis enabled me to get iry gun working again: secondly, it
must have shown tne band leader that I v/as in touch with our troops and
mat reinforcements would arrive at some time. The aeroplane was unable
to stay vi An us as it v/as close on dusk. When it had disappeared, the
Arabs continued their advance and closed right on to the tanks, I ordered
opl. Lewis and Cpl. Prosser to close down, v/hich they did. Unfortunately
a bullet struck my lid on the spring catch and jammed it open, so I was
unable to close dov/n. It was dark now and the enemy v/ere within 20 yards
of us. They v/ere firing from the v/adi, from behind the trees in the
olive grove, and from behind the numerous boulders. There were also