'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎107r] (218/294)

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t,.ne cli-j, arid D,y dark all troops had been withdrawn. The tanks held
in I’eserve^xiad not been needed, and ho. 6 (b) Squadron R.A.?., v/hich had
been^ carrying out continuous reconnaissance to the East of Jaffa through
out me d;.y, xiad not detected any movements which might have suggested
an aticjL.pl at ouosiae interference. During the subsequent v/eeks civil
and convict labour was employed to clear the debris in'the path of the
demolitions and start work on the road, while on the 29th and 30th June
Phase 4- wa.s completed without incident. A similar plan was adopted as
for Phase 3 and the same troops were employed, the demolitions forming
the fiis.v step towards the construction of the North and South circular
road.
The Military action taken against Jaffa proved to be entirely
successful. No further opposition from that quarter was ever encountered
afterwards, and the existence of good wide roads through the old laby
rinth of alleys will prevent the Old City ever being used again for the
purpose to which it was put by the rebels in the first months of the
rebellion. Except for the retaliatory shoot the whole operation was
conducted without casualties on either side, and provides a good
illustration of a means of reducing a recalcitrant urban area by the
most humane means. Its success had a very far-reaching effect through
out the whole country and may well be said to mark the end of organised
resistance in the towns. Prom June onwards the main rebel activities
were transferred to the hills there to be conducted on the lines of
guerrilla warfare by the armed bands, offering to the troops at last a
genuine military objective for offensive action.
O FFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ARMED BANDS
Characteristics of the Bands
By the time the bands had reached their full strength, the rebel
forces in arms in Palestine were composed of contingents of Palestinians,
Syrians, Iraqis, Druses and Trans-Jordanians. These contingents were
always under arms and were concentrated in bands in various parts of the
country. In addition the numerous villagers who possessed rifles formed
an auxilliary force which could be called upon to supply recruits for
the bands or to harass troops independently. For the most part the
rebels fought on foot, though some contingents included small bodies of
mounted men and at least one mule train v/as used to carry supplies and
ammunition. They were well served by spies who moved freely in the
vicinity of military camps etc. while the entire population stood firm
in withholding information from the authorities. The strength of the
bands is difficult to estimate v/ith any accuracy as so mang ol heir
adherents were villagers who wore not always 'under arms cuu who remained
at call in their villages during intervals of fighting. Local opinion
credited the organized bands v/ith some 1500 rifles and me auxiliaries
with twice that number, v/hile frequent stores reacnec. the authorities
of volunteers streaming into Palestine from over the Syrian Dordur and
across the desert from Iraq. It was found on investigation that these
reports were invariably exaggerated, and io is probably t-u^ reputed
strengths were also far above the truth. The most reliable estimate
placed the number in the regular bands at 670, and even tnis may nave
erred on the generous side. The real number of auxiliaries cannot be
computed, but it may be taken that most villages supplied thorn five oO
fifteen riflemen, depending upon their size and locality, wmle the
large ones probably contributed upwards ol hiir
The supreme commander of these bands was the ex-Iraqi officer,
?ausi al Qawaqji, who led a personal following oi .raqis anu^s ^led
himself the 0 leader of the Arab revolt m i - or them Palestine . The