'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎106r] (216/294)

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in which they lived gave them ample opportunity. Built upon a
low hill flanked on one side by the sea, it completely dominated the
Port and such buildings as the police station and barracks and the District
Commissioner's offices, which lay in the New City. Moreover its
houses formed a veritable rabbit warren through which dark and narrow
streets turned and twisted into a maze in which the level of one street
would often be the roof of the houses in the one below and where few
passages were so wide that they could not be spanned by the reach of a
man's arms. It represented in fact an exceedingly complicated trench
system with vertical sides some thirty to forty feet high, which
could readily be converted into a regular citadel.
It was into this citadel that the tougher elements of Jaffa
retired at the end of April when the police and troops had driven them
off the streets of the New City, where they had struck the first blows
of the rebellion on the 19th. Once inside they barricaded the narrow
entrances, covered all approaching roads with nails and broken glass,
and settled down to a campaign of sniping and bombing from what they
fondly believed to be an impregnable stronghold. By early May all
municipal services had ceased to function in the Old City and its
surroundings and the town was rapidly reaching an indescribable state
of filth, while rifle fire and bomb throwing was directed continually
on all parts of the town dominated by the commanding situation of the
Old City. All form of authority was in fact completely defied, and no
political or police officer could hope to enter the tortuous alleyways
without assassination. It was evident that stringent action to
reduce the place and restore some semblance of order could no longer
be delayed, especially as it was known that success in this direction
would strike a severe blow at the very heart of the rebellion. ¥hat
was more it would break the rebel domination of the Port of Jaffa and
give the authorities their chance of re-opening it by means of black
leg labour. It was thought that such action would force the lightermen
to return to work rather than see their means of livelihood disappear
completely, and this might well have succeeded in breaking the G-eneral
Strike altogether. The chances were all the greater in view of the
feverish efforts being made by the Jews to complete the jetty at Tel
Aviv in time to profit by the situation in Jaffa. Once its trade had
been diverted to Tel Aviv there was little chance of Jaffa ever recover
ing it, and in fact a continuance of the lightermens' strike bore
every resemblance of sheer suicide.
In drawing up military plans to deal with this situation there
seemed at first to be two fairly obvious courses, but unfortunately
circumstances were to prevent either being put into practice. ihe
first was to force an entry into the city and search it thoroughly with
troops: this would certainly have been strongly opposed and would have
led to heavy casualties on both sides in the sort of trench fighting
which would have had to follow. Moreover it would have needed con
siderably more troops than were available at the time. ^ The other
course was to blockade the city and reduce it by siege m which inhabit
ants would only be allowed to leave by surrendering themselves to the
police, and which would have continued until a fixed number of firearms
had been given up. This alternative had the obvious disadvantage of
being far too lengthy, and would also have caused a good deal of dis
tress among the women and children and other innocent inhabitants,
which the civil government were most anxious to avoid. A third
course had therefore to be adopted, and the plan whicn was eventually
approved comprised four phases :-
Phase 1.
A retaliatory shoot against those houses from which fire
had teen directed, to continue nightly until opposition
had ceased.