'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [93v] (191/294)
The record is made up of 1 volume (142 folios). It was created in Feb 1938. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
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44816-1
140
Jews and Arabs; that at Lydda nearly all Arabs reinforced by Royal
Engineers who dealt mainly with derailments and similar emergencies
Arabs again - except in those stations, serving purely Jewish districts
- supplied the station staffs and lived on the premises. Train crews
were Arabs mixed with some Egyptians and a few Jews, together with a
strong backing of R.N. and R.E. personnel who would have been sufficient
to maintain a limited service for strict essentials without the aid of
the Arab staff had this ever been necessary. The short line from Lydda
to Tel Aviv was operated at night throughout most of the rebellion by
the 42nd Field Company, R.E. Fortunately the railway employees remained
at work throughout, except for the period of the brief railv/ay strike in
August which followed "Black Hand" activities at Haifa, and there is no
doubt that for the most part they remained loyal in spite of intense
intimidation and perhaps some degree of sympathy with the rebels. There
were certainly cases of sabotage in which the expert hand could be
detected and not every worker was above suspicion, but on the whole the
railway staff, provided they received adequate protection, continued
loyally to carry out their duties under the greatest difficulties, and
they deserve full recognition. Most of the employees (except plate
layers) lived on railway premises and formed a small community of their
own which made their protection from intimidators somewhat easier, while
this semi-isolation undoubtedly helped to strengthen the very high
esprit de corps which already existed and which was mainly responsible
for holding the railwayman together throughout the rebellion.
The Platelayers were perhaps the vital link in the chain, being
difficult to replace and rather more exposed to danger than the other
workers, while it was through their efforts alone that the worst effects
of sabotage could be avoided. It was in fact their success in detecting
and repairing sabotage on the permanent way which made them targets for
the worst violence and intimidation, and their protection by troops was
therefore a necessary step in obtaining security for rail traffic. It
was complicated by the fact that the platelayers were widely scattered,
living in gang posts some ten kilometres apart in parties of about ten
under a Ganger (Foreman) and spending most of their time "walking the
line" for inspection purposes.
Attacks on the Railway
Attacks were directed either against employees, trains, or the
permanent way with its stations, bridges, v/orkshops, telephones and
signals. At first sabotage was carried out principally at night, but
later tended to become more prevalent by day.
The protection of workers necessitated the guarding of the areas
where they lived and worked and the provision of escorts when they left
protected areas for duties along the line. Ibr most of these tasks it
was necessary to employ troops, although in many cases Supemumaiy Police
were^ adequate as station guards. Fortunately little protection was
required for the railway area at Haifa, but at Lydda a well lit and
guarded perimeter had to be preserved. At both places reserves were
held to accompany breakdov/n parties, while protection for the platelayers
involved the distrioution of troons in pemanent way detachments through
out the system.
Attacks on trains, apart from attempts at derailment, were confined
to sniping and the throwing of occasional bombs. Neither did more than
cause some intimidation of passengers and train crews, but nevertheless
necessitated travelling escorts of a few soldiers or police to give
confluence. Aircraft were often used to escort trains through sections
where sniping was most frequent and generally proved to be a complete _
preventive. Derailments were often heavily sniped, and required special
About this item
- Content
Report detailing the military lessons of the Arab rebellion in Palestine in 1936 that was compiled by General Staff, Headquarters, The British Forces, Palestine & Trans-Jordan.
The report is divided up into chapters as follows:
- Introduction
- A Short History of the Rebellion I - to the end of June, 1936
- A Short History of the Rebellion II - from the 1st July, 1936 to the end of the year
- Conditions in Palestine as Affecting Operations
- Commanders and Staffs
- Intelligence
- Intercommunication
- Administration
- Transport
- Weapons and Equipment
- The Employment of Various Arms
- The Employment of Aircraft in Co-operation with Troops
- Defensive Action
- Protection of Communications
- Offensive Action
- Conclusion - Summary of Main Lessons
The report contains 46 photographs and a number of diagrams which are located throughout the volume. It also contains four maps, found at folios 140-143.
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (142 folios)
- Arrangement
The volume contains a contents page on folio 3.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1 and terminates at the inside back cover with 144; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. Pagination: the volume also contains an original printed pagination sequence.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [93v] (191/294), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/16/16, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100040717909.0x0000c0> [accessed 24 February 2025]
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Copyright: How to use this content
- Reference
- IOR/L/MIL/17/16/16
- Title
- 'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936'
- Pages
- front, back, spine, edge, head, tail, front-i, 2r:110v, 111ar:111av, 111r:139v, back-i
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence