'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎86r] (176/294)

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There remains the alternative of the passive defence of property
by means of booby traps and obstacles alone. This was tried with
marked success in Palestine and effected many economies. Booby traps
could be used in different ways according to whether their object was
to frighten saboteurs avray from places where their attentions were only
a nuisance, or to provide positive protection to some really vital
point. In the former bluff sometimes played a part and very seldom
failed, while in the latter 10($ protection could be assured provided
the safety device was thoroughly concealed. Saboteurs on the whole
displayed little technical knowledge and often overlooked the weakest
links in any chain. To place a guard over these might have drawn
attention to possibilities which had so far been neglected, and at
such places therefore guards were deliberately avoided and protection
secured by means of booby traps. Experience proved the wisdom of these
methods.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this chapter the first object of the armed
forces has been quoted as being the maintenance of the normal life
of the country, and the same object is given first place in Imperial
Policing, 195 4. But before closing the question may well be asked
as to -whether it is the most important aim. Experiences in Palestine
go to shov/ that under conditions of rebellion the normal life of the
country cannot continue, and the expenditure of a great deal of
military effort to pretend that it can may only result in a prolonga
tion of the struggle.
Rebellion is after all only one form of War, and in war the aim
is defined as H overcoming the will of the enemy to continue the struggle
by forcing him to realize that his aim is impossible of attainment or
beyond the effort that he is prepared to make. M (E.S.RTTlI, 1955, Sec. .
One of the v/ays of doing this is to deny him the means of conducting
his national life and, though it vdll seldom be politic to apply this
in full to rebellion, it must surely be illogical to use armed force
to maintain the national life, which of course includes that of the
entire rebel population. In fa.ct a partial paralysis of life has
certain definite advantages: it is bound to handicap rebel actiyioies,
it releases most of the military forces from defensive duties, it
frees large numbers of civilians to swell the ranks ol the police and
volunteer forces, and must of sheer necessity shorten the period of
resistance. It v/ill of course injure innocent people with the guilty,
but it v/ill remove that apathy v/hich prevailed among so many of the
population of Palestine. In rebellion there can be no neutrals, an
all who are not in revolt must play their part in suppressing it.
When rebellion has forced business to a standstill the waverer with
little sympathy for either side is likely to be forced into acti\e
participation on the side of the Government in order oo restore con
ditions v/hich mil enable him to resume his occupation. In Palestine
a large proportion of the people cared more for business than P 0 ^ 1 -
and took no active part on either side: if able to do so, they ^ ae
impartially with both and thus helped considerably in prolonging the
struggle.
Imperial Policing names as the second task the gubjectiop_^f__t^ig.
hostile elements , r . and Operation Instruction No. 23 conformed in giving
the armed forces their second object in Palestine. after v * a '
been said above it may be considered that the order of iinpox ^nce o _
the two aims should at least be reversed, and it may even be better m
future to take the second aim as the sole one. Each requires vei^y
different action by the forces, and the attempt to attain o m