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'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎85r] (174/294)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (142 folios). It was created in Feb 1938. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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The casual bomber or gunman was a far more regular feature and
possessed considerably less courage. For him the get-away had to be
cei c l n y . cnac wao of iiiucn more importance than the selection of his
victim. i'iost of the latter were no more than passing Jews, or suspected
Jews, or the rank and file of the Arab strike-breakers - villagers
bringing vegetables to market, shopkeepers doing a furtive business at
the bac k moor, 01 in fact any mrab uoing any sort of business at all»
The explosion of a Mills bomb in a crowd of vegetable sellers at the
Jaffa ‘j-ate of Jerusalem, v.hich caused 26 casualties, provided a typical
example of hio vor.:'_» Ic ‘v.as the fact that he was so indiscriminate that
made thio cype difficult co contend with* Again the best preventive
was to use e^eiy means of making his task more and more dangerous, while
at the same time insisting on officials and members of the Services at
least adopting elementary precautions for their own safety. It was
noticeable how seldom soldiers or airmen were selected as targets by
this type of terrorist, and two airmen who were shot Y. r hile walking on
the outskirts of Jerusalem were the sole victims. The fact that°troops
never went about singly, were usually armed, and were known to have
little hesitation in using their arms, accounted to a great extent for
their comparative immunity. Avoidance of notorious areas - especially
on foot - frequent variation of habits, and a wary eye on suspicious
characters were always necessary.
The bomber ’was such a prominent local product as to deserve special
mention. Strangely enough so far as the effects of his own weapon were
concerned he seemed for once to display a conplete disregard of all
danger, and the accidental mortality among all who handled bombs v/as
extraordinarily high. Yet, with usual Arab indifference, their manu
facture in the family circle by the very crudest methods continued to
flourish all over the country; and the frequent entries in official
communiques of " unlocat ed bomb explosion reported..... generally marked
the passing of some over-confident munition maker. Even when finished
the Palestinian bomb as often as not went off at the wrong time, and it
is not far from the truth to say that in the long run they probably
caused more damage to their owners than to the general public. This
was rather surprising in view of the unrivalled facilities in Palestine
for making bombs. So much of the country is rook that even the simplest
building operation necessitates blasting, and in consequence large stocks
of explosives are distributed over the country together with inhabitants
possessing a rough-and-ready knowledge of their use. Some Arab families
even continued to make their livings by manufacturing explosives under
government licence. In addition the Great War had littered the country
with ammunition dumps which had never been properly cleared and which
continued to provide endless sup£)lies of cordite, shells and old hand
grenades. The home-filled Mills bomb in particular was one of the
most dangerous weapons - to both sides. 1
The sniper represented a still lower degree in the rebel scale.
He took even fev/er risks since he was always behind good cover and
fired at long range, while his standard of musketry only required him to
be able to land his bullets in some part of a camp or town. He very
seldom accounted for any casualties, but his nuisance value was rather
higher than that of any other intimidator. The knowledge of this,
however, probably counted far less with him than the fun he got out of
it and the cheap local prestige which he gained. He alv/uys operated at
night and usually alone, working regular hours within comfortable reach
of his own home and surprisingly conservative in his habits. Military
opinion at the end of 1936 was unanimous that the last way to treat the
sniper was to return his fire with rifles, an action which only encouraged
him to think he was doing more harm than was actually the case and which
dia not affect him behind his carefully chosen cover. A better answer
was to reply with artillery, mortars, or concentrated machine-gun fire.
This was often effective where the favourite haunts of snipers were
known and had been registered, and the discovery of live ammunition

About this item

Content

Report detailing the military lessons of the Arab rebellion in Palestine in 1936 that was compiled by General Staff, Headquarters, The British Forces, Palestine & Trans-Jordan.

The report is divided up into chapters as follows:

  • Introduction
  • A Short History of the Rebellion I - to the end of June, 1936
  • A Short History of the Rebellion II - from the 1st July, 1936 to the end of the year
  • Conditions in Palestine as Affecting Operations
  • Commanders and Staffs
  • Intelligence
  • Intercommunication
  • Administration
  • Transport
  • Weapons and Equipment
  • The Employment of Various Arms
  • The Employment of Aircraft in Co-operation with Troops
  • Defensive Action
  • Protection of Communications
  • Offensive Action
  • Conclusion - Summary of Main Lessons

The report contains 46 photographs and a number of diagrams which are located throughout the volume. It also contains four maps, found at folios 140-143.

Extent and format
1 volume (142 folios)
Arrangement

The volume contains a contents page on folio 3.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1 and terminates at the inside back cover with 144; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. Pagination: the volume also contains an original printed pagination sequence.

Written in
English in Latin script
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'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎85r] (174/294), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/MIL/17/16/16, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100040717909.0x0000af> [accessed 11 June 2026]

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