'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎77r] (158/294)

44816-1
109
detachments were closer or more effective than they were in Palestine,
and the mutual experience which was gained must have been of lasting
value to 'both services.
AIR GO-OPERATION El PRACTICE
Such then were the arrangements made for securing the greatest
possible degree of co-operation between aircraft and the troops in the
field. It remains to be seen how they worked out in practice.
Broadly speaking co-operation took four main forms :-
(a) Offensive action against armed bands.
(b) Reconnaissance.
(c) Air escorts to land forces.
(d) The use of aircraft for intercommunication and occasionally
supply of army detachments.
Offensive action against armed bands
This sometimes took the form of air action alone, resulting from a
chance encounter by an aircraft engaged on another task such as recon
naissance or escort duty, but more often arose as a result of an XX call
sent out from the ground and answered by the Air Striking Force. Before
discussing the work of the Air Striking Force in detail, it may however
be convenient here to quote an example of the former type of action in
order to illustrate the striking power of a single independent aircraft
operating against an armed band without the co-operation of troops other
them the small infantry escort to a civilian convoy. The action took
place on the 19th July among the barren and rugged hillsides which
flank the road from Jericho to Jerusalem. Shortly before dark a convoy
of Jewish lorries carrying potash from the Dead Sea v/orks was winding
its way slowly up the very steep climb into Jerusalem and had still some
ten miles to go, when fire was suddenly opened from about fifteen rilles
on a piece of high ground overlooking the road at short range. Far
away overhead was a high-flying bomber of No. 6 Squadron which had been
watching the progress of the convoy almost out of sight .and hearing.
The moment the firing started a red Verey light went up from the convoy
escort, and down came the aircraft. Action with both front and rear
guns quickly broke the enemy attack on the convoy, and a bomb attack
v/as then delivered. As the main body of the rebels bolted for cover
the pilot saw four others opening fire on the convoy from the cresu of a
hill. He attacked with three bombs in salvo, and then dealt with his
front gun with each of the fleeing figures until neighbouring caves had
swallowed up the few survivors. The convoy was then escorted oafely
into Jerusalem and the aircraft returned to Ramleh, where inspection
showed that the enemy had scored hits in four places. Seven known
Arab casualties had resulted from this engagement.
To return to the XX call system and its results: inwall 47 calls
were made and the aircraft which answered them accounted lor reoe
casualties. Even this
Even this limited experience of the XX ^ organization m
:o point to a far wider application of its principles ander
TJ- „ o-nnd ouDortuni ties to a