'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎72v] (149/294)

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Frequent personal contact between troops and pilots and an adequat
supply of military information to aircraft crews were two of the chief 6
essentials of effective co-operation. Both were facilitated by a
liberal lay-out of landing grounds throughout the country. i n -the
transmission of information the single Air Liaison Section at Ramleh was
of great assistance, but experience showed that squadrons required a
better supply of up-to-date information on the general situation. This
can best be effected by including in the intelligence distribution list
of each Brigade those R.A.F. Stations with which the Brigade is working
The work of co-operating with troops had reached such a very high stand
ard in the flight of No. 6 (Bomber) Squadron permanently stationed in
Palestine that it was not always remembered that bomber squadrons employed
upon such duties usually require, more detailed information and
instructions from the army than do the Army Co-operation Squadrons.
CO-OPERATION BY THE ROYAL NAVY
Throughout the whole of the rebellion various ships of the Royal
Navy were stationed at Haifa, and naval personnel co-operated actively
with the Army and the Royal Air Force in many different ways both on
land and sea. Command of the naval forces was exercised by the Senior
Naval Officer at Haifa, acting under the orders of the C-in-C,
Mediterranean. For operational purposes in Palestine the former was
responsible to the High Commissioner and not to the A.O.C. - or later
G.O.C. - British Forces. Up to the 22nd September the Rear-Admiral,
3rd Cruiser Squadron, was the S.N.O. at Haifa, being relieved on that
date by the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. " Valiant ". The work of the
Royal Navy has been described in detail in Appendix 5 of Air Vice-
Marshal Peirse's Despatch, and most of it is discussed under the appro
priate ^ headings in various parts of this book. It may however be
convenient here to summarise briefly the forms which it took.
(a) ihe provision and manning of the gun and searchlight lorries,
tne two armoured trains, and the two 3:7-in. howitzers at Nablus,
all ox which have already been referred to.
(b) The strengthening of the Customs Guards at Haifa by naval
ratings and the^manning of a Customs patrol boat in the harbour
i or the prevention of arms smuggling.
(o) Naval landing parties in the Haifa Area. Parties - up to
.. st : en S th ° f 9 2 Platoons on one occasion - were landed at various
° r ~ lnforc e troops and police in Haifa Town, while a reserve
noti on available for landing at short
tw * n . "' °' 1 . :Lon R °Y a l Marine platoons co-operated with troops
owe occasions in the protection of Jewish colonies near Haifa.
tiv e T c^^° Vi a i0n 0f technioal railway personnel. Thirteen locomo-
strengthen a /* U2 J 1 ? er anne d railway guards were employed to
strengthen the civilian staff of the Palestine railways.
were undertaken^ 0 *} , , FrWt the 26th June onwards coast patrols
aims smurrlinp- ~ GS y oyers ^ trawlers as a deterrent against
a-m. smuggling. Ships’ aircraft co-operated on this duty.
ers were"despatched ^affa occasio £? de '
were in prorres- - ° . Jaffa while military operations
from the J moral effect "of ^ demolitions in June * ^
policed the entrance fr ? appearance, the destroyers’ boats
their search! iTh+c-" o+- • u nd exi t s from the Old City by sea \^iil e
b a night kept the waterfront of the city under