'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎71v] (147/294)

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(e) Providing platelayer look-outs- on certain patrol trains and
railcars to deal with cases of sabotage, mines and etc.
(f) Work on the clearance of train wrecks.
(g) Providing passenger train escorts, which afforded good
opportunities of studying the operation of the railway.
Searchlight Companies
One of these units was available for the second half of the rebellion
in the unfamiliar role of illuminating the ground rather than the
sky. This was "A” Company of the 1st. Anti-Aircraft Battalion. The
Company was divided into self-contained single light detachments of one
N.C.O. and four men each - since sound-locator numbers were not required
- and widely dispersed almost literally "from Dan to Beersheba". Later
when the Company devised a method of burning lights without off-loading
projectors from the lorries, the detachments were used in the role of
mobile units moving their base of operations frequently with a view
to achieving the maximum surprise. Although each searchlight detach
ment was armed with rifles and a Lewis gun, an infantry escort for the
light was always necessary, and each detachment was placed under the
orders of the infantry or cavalry unit to which it was allotted and
which assumed responsibility for the tactical employment and protection
of the light.
Fixed lights were employed for the illumination of certain vulner
able areas where sabotage was frequent, such as the installations at the
source of the Jerusalem water supply and certain important railway areas;
and also as a counter-measure against snipers operating against such
favourable targets as Nablus camp or the town of Jerusalem. The
roving detachments ot mobile lights performed valuable work in patrolling
the railway and the oil pipe-line where suitable roads existed in the
vicinity.
t * searchlight was undoubtedly far too powerful and not
sufficiently mobile for the tasks it was required to perform in
Palestine, but nevertheless it proved to be an excellent deterrent
against saboteurs and snipers and did much to enable economies to be
effected in the troops employed upon purely defensive duties at night,
•/.oreovei it was often able to give good assistance to infantry picquets
and patrols operating against rebels at night. After a little experi
ence in on try made good use of the lights by working up unseen under
cover of the beam, which alone had a very demoralising effect on the
enemy. Under good conditions the range of the beam was from 8 to 10
ml an eie no question that the Arab credited it with even
greater powers, so that on some of the long straight stretches of raii-
or •^ 1 ^ )C ' lne a san £^- e searchlight would effectively prevent inter-
eience over u length of some 20 miles without the employment of any
• °r n ff t]aan lts own small escort. Few Arabs ever dared to move
• n G , J ; Sho . ° f the beain > even at long range, and the fact that there
to the morallffect? ° f S bei “ 8 hit by fire is a S ood testimonial
SIGNALS
inn with ' . operations is the necessity of incluc
not “,il the ( lT P* 3 l n ° mal Wrtion of signal units. It was
complete^unit ofrt ^ ° f ^ “
Up to that date signal hquirAarh e WaS Sent t0 Pales ' tlne * ,
Air Perce re^ourep^ h-c } mcnts haa ^oen met entirely from Royal
Ffnmt i-lped out by periodical drafts of R. Signals fron
^ v ' aS not imtl1 the Emergency Force came from England thai