'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎70v] (145/294)

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and it was necessary to resort to the practice of towing guns on the
road with 30-cwt. lorries while the dragons followed separately to be
available for cross-country Y/ork when required. This system increased
the speed, but even the lorry-drawn guns could not keep up v/ith the in
fantry on hill roads. Once off the roads suitable gun positions could
often be reached after careful reconnaissance, but serious communication
difficulties were experienced. It was usually impossible to get the
battery W/T vehicles forward to the observations posts, and telephone
lines would have to be laid by hand over long distances. TThere visual
was employed, one, tv/o, or even three relaying stations had at times
to be provided, with the result that the transmission of fire orders and
tactical messages was hopelessly slow for the fleeting nature of the
target usually presented. Artillery, in common with other arms, also
suffered from the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and foe
among rocks and olive trees v/hich only too often restricted the area
in which it was safe to fire.
ENGINEERS
Field Companies
The first Royal Engineers unit to arrive in Palestine was the 42nd
Field Company from Egypt, a mixed company that included a railway
detachment. It was followed in the middle of June by the 2nd Field
Company, which was relieved by the 17th Company in September. Three
more field companies - 9th, 12th and 26th - also arrived in September,
as well as the 6th Field Park Company which was retained at the base at
Haifa. The Field Companies suffered throughout from a shortage of men,
and it would seem that at anything less than full war establishment the
Field Company is not an economical unit. It was usually necessary
during these operations to provide a detachment of sappers to each
infantry brigade headquarters, and this dispersion reduced further
still the numbers actually available for work. As a result, many
reconnaissances vdiich would normally have required an officer had to
be undertaken by h.C.O’s, while working parties v/hich in war would have
been under an N.C.O. were often in the charge of a Sapper. There is
li ttle doubt that one or two Field Companies at war strength would have
produced a greater output of Y/ork than several smaller units totalling
tne same numbers. It is most desirable that the motor transport
allotted to R.E. units should be at least as fast as that allotted to
tLe tx ^try: on the hill roads of Palestine the Field Coinpanies were
much delayed by 30-cwt. lorries towing heavy trailers.
xhe duties Ox the Field Companies may be summarised as under :-
(a) Clearing Communications
Forties of sappers, up to a dozen strong, would either accompany
x-.x. columns or stand by at suitable centres to assist in the
removal of obstructions on the roads and railv/ays, v/hich frequently
included mines or "booby traps", and to effect the necessary
repairs to oridges e^c. Attention to enemy booby traus proved
to be^a frequent duty, and without R.E. assistance there would
certain g «.\e been many more casualties from this particular
menace. ■ L
(b) Protection of Communications
Much passive protection of bridges, culverts, waterpipe valves
& etc. ,/as afforded by the laying of booby traps by Royal
and ^, iese traps were responsible for inflicting a
b 01 CaSualt ies on the rebels. The booby trap system proved