'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎66r] (136/294)

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The Royal Air Force cars were organized with the half section as
the tactical unit, the latter consisting of two armoured cars, a T/T
tender and a supply tender. The two tenders carried Lewis guns on
Scarf e ring mountings, but they were unarmoured and as a rule accompanied
the armoured cars by daylight only. For purposes of maintenance each
section in turn was withdrawn into reserve at the base at Rami eh, where
one half went out of action for maintenance while the other stood by as
a R.A.F. reserve for special purposes such as assisting in the recovery
or repair of stranded aircraft. The tactical unit of the 11th Hussars
was the troop of three armoured cars. As in the case of the tank
section, the troop was usually too strong for the task in hand and could
not easily be divided into two sub-units. In practice therefore the
11th Hussars troop usually operated with two cars only while the necessary
maintenance was being carried out on the third, thus avoiding any with
drawal of complete units for mechanical reasons.
Since all night moves of infantry M.T. columns, and many of the
daylight convoys as well, required armoured car escorts it was imposs
ible to avoid wide dispersion. In most cases the cars were split up
into the smallest units and attached more or less permanently to infantry
battalions. This naturally produced many drawbacks: it made adminis
tration difficult, and gave regimental and even squadron and company
commanders little opportunity of exercising their commands. On the
other hand with armoured cars and tanks perhaps more than with any other
arm it was essentially a "subaltern's war", and the very close and
effective co-operation which resulted between armoured cars and in
fantry was in great measure due to the fact that the junior officer and
his men lived with the infantry battalion with whom they were working.
Armoured cars were employed upon most of the tasks v/hich have
already been described as falling to the lot of the tanks. On the net-
work of good main roads existing in Palestine they were faster and more
silent than tanks, they were less susceptible to wear and tear and even
on the rough tracks gave a creditable performance. On the other hand
they were comparatively easy to ditch and trap and, being unsrmoured
underneath, were vulnerable to mines. It was usually necessary for a
truckload of infantry to accompany armoured caurs for the purpose of
removing road blocks. The main tasks of cars may be summarised as
under:-
(a) Ilobile striking force - especially in co-operation with
motorized infantry.
(b) Patrolling main roads by day and night,
(c) Escorting motorized infantry columns, civilian convoys, and
naval pom-pom detachments,
(d) Acting as mobile flank guards to prevent escape of rebels
during the "search" of an area or village,
A great deal of the work of the armoured crus was at night, when
unarmoured vehicles ran a grave danger of heavy casualties irom su^aen
bursts of close range rifle fire from ambush.
MOTOR CA VALRY
Under this heading come the 8th Hussars with their Foi is^hnile
the two Mechanized Infantry Companies of the Trans- Jordan^ronmer
Force may conveniently be considered at the same time. ^.° 1Ca
unit of the 8th Hussars was the Troop of four 15-cwt. Ford VS. Pick-ups
and one 50-cwt. truck: each carried four men and mounted a